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BATTERED BY LAW: THE POLITICAL
SUBORDINATION OF IMMIGRANT WOMEN
MARIELA OLIVARES*
The Article explores the state of immigrant battered women in the United
States, focusing on how their identity as a politically and culturally
marginalized community impacts the measure of help that they receive.
Specifically, the Article examines the 2012–2013 Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) reauthorization debate as an example of how membership in a
marginalized community affects legislative successes and failures.
Part I briefly outlines the unique obstacles faced by the battered immigrant
woman in securing help and leaving violence in the home—for example,
cultural and linguistic barriers, poverty, access to justice issues, and fear of
authority and of immigration repercussions. Importantly, the status of
immigrant outsider in this country contributes to and exacerbates the
marginalization that the battered woman already faces as a victim of domestic
violence. Part II discusses the legislative successes aimed at helping the
community of immigrant domestic violence victims, focusing on VAWA. Since
its legislative introduction in 1994, VAWA has included provisions aimed at
helping battered immigrants. Yet, the methods in which the law has provided
assistance to battered immigrants has weathered varying degrees of political
controversy. Part III focuses on how this controversy ultimately drives
legislative advocacy, successes, and failures. This discussion elaborates on
how the community of battered immigrants is affected by the current era of
anti-immigrant rhetoric and immigration law and policy reform. To
illustrate, this Part discusses the 2012–2013 VAWA reauthorization battle in
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Congress and how vehement opposition to the provisions aimed at helping
immigrant women amplifies the continuing challenges that battered
immigrants face. Importantly, the Article examines how the status of the
immigrant outsider intended beneficiary (e.g., the immigrant victims
encompassed in VAWA) affects the ways in which legislation is drafted,
lobbied, and ultimately passed or rejected. Part III then ties together the
immigrant outsider and battered woman identities with subordination and
citizenship theories and stresses and examines how as the most vulnerable and
marginalized population, battered immigrant women experience heightened
and explicit subordination by the political process and, ultimately,
institutionalized law and policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Unprecedented in the past two decades of partisan politics,
legislators of both political parties are working together to fix the
“broken” immigration system.1 At the heart of the dispute are the
parameters outlining admission and removal procedures of
immigrants in the United States. From its earliest legislative
iterations through the 2013 introduction of the comprehensive
immigration bill,2 immigration law and policy have spurred
contentious debate about to whom benefits should be given. The
spectrum of those potentially eligible for lawful immigration status
has shifted, however, through past waves of reform—from an era of
explicitly exclusionary laws based on race and national origin3 to the
most recent reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA),4 which contains provisions on helping immigrant victims of
domestic violence achieve lawful permanent resident (LPR) and
other stable immigration statuses.5 In some ways, the historical
progression of immigration law provides relief to immigrants who
were historically not the most revered or sought after for inclusion in
our American society.
Thus, through measures like VAWA,
immigration law contemplates extending benefits to some of the
most vulnerable of the immigrant community—battered immigrants.
1. See, e.g., Lindsey Boerma, Despite the Odds, Both Sides Optimistic for Immigration
Reform, CBS NEWS (July 15, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/despitethe-odds-both-sides-optimistic-for-immigration-reform (discussing how rising political
pressures caused lawmakers from both parties to stress the importance of
overhauling the immigration system); see also Graham: Without Immigration, GOP to
Fail in 2016, ST. AUGUSTINE REC., June 17, 2013 (reporting on influential Republican
Senator Lindsay Graham’s blunt observation of his party’s politically untenable
stance on immigration: “We’re in a demographic death spiral as a party and the only
way we can get back in good graces with the Hispanic community in my view is [to]
pass comprehensive immigration reform” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Clarence Page, Loss Spurs Republicans to Rethink Immigration Stance, J. NEWS, Dec. 16,
2012, at A10 (noting that for the first time since the failed effort in 2007, there is a
genuine immigration reform debate in the Republican Party). But see Editorial, Savor
the Bipartisan Moment, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 22, 2013 (arguing that
passage of legislation should not be assumed despite initial bipartisan efforts); Sean
Sullivan, Three Signs of Trouble for Immigration Reform in the House, WASH. POST (June
21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/06/21/three-signsof-trouble-for-immigration-reform-in-the-house (detailing significant obstacles to
securing House Republican support for comprehensive immigration reform).
2. Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013).
3. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Chinese Exclusion Act and other
discriminatory immigration law measures).
4. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127
Stat. 54 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(iv) (2012) (granting immigrants who are
victims of domestic violence the opportunity to petition the U.S. Attorney General
for protected status); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c) (2014) (explaining the self-petition process).
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Yet, in spite of their extreme vulnerability due to a confluence of
situations and incidents largely out of their control,6 immigrant
victims of domestic violence remain controversial recipients of
proposed governmental aid through legislative measures. The story
of the battered immigrant—her and her family’s humanity, suffering,
and plight—is often obscured by the vociferousness of the
immigration reform political debate. As advocates and legislators on
both sides of the political spectrum acknowledge the need for
humanitarian immigration reform to some degree, the recent debate
on VAWA reauthorization reveals just how contentious it is to provide
legislatively-created benefits to immigrants, just because of the
immigrant identity status.
This Article explores this intersection where immigrant identity
meets political process. In particular, the Article explores the status
of immigrant battered women in the United States and how their
identity as a politically and culturally marginalized community
impacts the measure of legislative help that they receive. To
accomplish this end, the Article examines the VAWA 2013
reauthorization debate to illustrate how the status of immigrant
outsider as a proposed beneficiary of legislation affects the eventual
success or failure of that legislation. Part I provides a brief
background on the unique obstacles battered immigrant women face
in securing help and escaping violence in the home. Importantly,
the status of immigrant outsider in this country contributes to and
exacerbates the marginalization that the battered woman already
faces as a victim of domestic violence. Part II then discusses VAWA
and its history, focusing on the inclusion of the immigrant victim of
domestic violence throughout the law’s life. VAWA was the first
large-scale federal effort to provide assistance to domestic violence
victims while incorporating immigrant victims within its purview. Part
II describes the VAWA 2013 reauthorization battle and how political
attempts to shut out efforts to help immigrant women illustrate the
continuing challenges that battered immigrants face. Part III
discusses the concept of immigrant outsider identity through the
lenses of subordination and citizenship theories, stressing and
examining how as a vulnerable and marginalized population,
battered immigrant women experience heightened and explicit
subordination by the political process and, ultimately, by
institutionalized law and policy. In this discussion, critical race
6. See infra Part I (describing the various barriers that isolate battered
immigrants, such as manipulative abuse, poverty, language, and access to justice).
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theory, gender subordination theory, and theoretical frameworks of
citizenship are explored to provide a basis to analyze how the identity
of battered immigrant is politically and socially marginalized.
Furthermore, this Part analyzes the subordination model through the
VAWA 2013 context, drawing on scholarship and history to illustrate
how the status of the immigrant outsider intended beneficiary affects
the ways in which legislation is drafted, lobbied, and ultimately passed
or rejected. As an example of comprehensive legislation—even one
aimed at the most vulnerable among us—VAWA 2013 provides a
unique window into how immigrant outsider identity works against
otherwise uncontroversial legislation.
I.

REALITIES OF VULNERABILITY: THE CASE OF BATTERED IMMIGRANTS

Scholars, activists, and advocates have written and spoken about
the challenges faced by victims of domestic violence.7 That the
problem of domestic violence is part of our popular culture8 is a
testament to the progress that survivors and their advocates have
made to educate others about the plight of victims. Faced with
physical abuse, emotional abuse, and an array of abusive tactics aimed
7. See, e.g., Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor:
Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 117, 137–38
(2012) (discussing unforeseen consequences of new crime control strategies on
domestic violence victims in poor urban neighborhoods); Sudha Shetty & Janice
Kaguyutan, Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence: Cultural Challenges and Available
Legal Protections, VAWNET (Feb. 2002), http://www.vawnet.org/applied-researchpapers/print-document.php?doc_id=384 (focusing on the challenges immigrant
battered women face, such as cultural beliefs that provide rationalizations to justify
domestic violence and barriers to accessing public services); Erik Stegman & Katie
Wright, Low-Income Victims of Domestic Violence Facing a Political Super Storm, CENTER FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/
news/2013/02/27/54953/low-income-victims-of-domestic-violence-facing-a-politicalsuper-storm (lamenting the dual financial perils federal budget sequestration and
the delayed reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act pose to domestic
violence victim support programs).
8. See, e.g., Maria Elena Fernandez, 50 Cent Tweet-Brags About His Domestic Violence
and Vandalism Charges, TODAY (July 5, 2013, 3:22 PM), http://www.today.com/
entertainment/50-cent-tweet-brags-about-his-domestic-violence-vandalism-charges6C10551684 (reporting on charges brought against best-selling rapper Curtis James
“50 Cent” Jackson III for his alleged domestic violence attack on his girlfriend); see
also Leticia Miranda, Love the Way You Lie: Pop Culture, Race and Domestic Violence,
MEDIA LITERACY PROJECT (May 20, 2011), http://medialiteracyproject.org/blog/loveway-you-lie-pop-culture-race-and-domestic-violence (asserting that performers
Rihanna and Eminem’s glorification of domestic violence in the music video for
their chart-topping single “Love the Way You Lie” “was a missed opportunity for both
artists to help shift cultural norms towards healthier relationships” and “[i]nstead,
[was] at minimum a shallow narration of a violent relationship and at worst a
glorified story of abuse and romance”). As of December 2014, the National
Domestic Violence Hotline’s Facebook page had received over forty thousand “likes.”
National Domestic Violence Hotline, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
NationalDomesticViolenceHotline (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
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at maintaining power and control, victims of domestic violence are
frequently isolated from larger communities of support systems.9
This experience of isolation thus contributes to the difficulties victims
face in leaving abusive relationships because they are unfamiliar with
or unable to access help networks that could facilitate their freedom
from their batterers. Moreover, women facing manipulative tactics to
keep them in abusive relationships may not have the financial
resources to care for themselves and their children10 should they
leave their abusers, further compounding the scarcity of their choices.
Battered immigrants frequently face additional layers of isolation.
Poverty, inability to secure legal representation for access to courts,
language barriers, and culturally derived limitations may operate as
barriers to immigrants seeking to leave abusive relationships.11 As has
been recently and consistently documented by demographic and
labor data, immigrants—particularly immigrant women—are among
the poorest people in the United States.12 Moreover, undocumented
immigrants or those who do not have authorization to work lawfully
9. See Mary B. Clark, Falling Through the Cracks: The Impact of VAWA 2005’s
Unfinished Business on Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 37, 38–39 (2007) (explaining the compounded isolating
effect that cultural dynamics have on battered immigrant women over whom
common domestic violence means of power and control is also exerted); see also
Betsy Abramson et al., Isolation as a Domestic Violence Tactic in Later Life Cases: What
Attorneys Need to Know, 3 NAELA J. 47, 48–49 (2007) (discussing the use of isolation to
exert power and control over domestic violence victims in their elder years).
10. See Susan L. Pollet, Economic Abuse: The Unseen Side of Domestic Violence, 83 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 40, 41 (2011) (noting although both genders suffer from domestic violence
generally and economic abuse particularly, most of the victims are women).
11. See Mariela Olivares, A Final Obstacle: Barriers to Divorce for Immigrant Victims of
Domestic Violence in the United States, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 149, 154–56 (2011)
[hereinafter Olivares, A Final Obstacle] (describing how legal assistance is often
unattainable for battered immigrant women in divorce proceedings); Leslye E.
Orloff & Janice V. Kaguyutan, Offering a Helping Hand: Legal Protections for Battered
Immigrant Women: A History of Legislative Responses, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
95, 97 (2002) (identifying immigrant women’s dual pressure to assimilate while
maintaining the cultural traditions of their country of origin as one of many barriers
to getting help when faced with domestic violence).
12. See MARY BAUER & MÓNICA RAMÍREZ, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., INJUSTICE ON OUR
PLATES: IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE U.S. FOOD INDUSTRY 24 (2010), available at
http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/Injustice_on_
Our_Plates.pdf (citing RANDY CAPPS ET AL., URBAN INST., A PROFILE OF THE LOW-WAGE
IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE 1 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
310880_lowwage_immig_wkfc.pdf) (noting how because women generally earn less
in jobs than their male counterparts, immigrant women who benefited from prior
legalization programs experienced higher rates of increased income than men who
were already paid at higher rates); ALEXANDRA CAWTHORNE, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
THE STRAIGHT FACTS ON WOMEN IN POVERTY 1–2 (2008), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/report/2008/10/08/5103/thestraight-facts-on-women-in-poverty (discussing the disparity in levels of poverty
between women and men in the United States, with more women than men
consistently being impoverished).
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must work outside the legally prescribed means in order to provide
for themselves and their families. These jobs typically pay less than
authorized work and offer little or no job security.13 And many
immigrants are ineligible for public benefits and thus unable to access
safety nets traditionally available to the poor.14 Thus, with few financial
resources and options for stable adequate employment, leaving an
abuser—and his financial support—becomes even more difficult.
Further, lack of familiarity with the American legal and criminal
justice systems provides challenges for immigrants who do not
typically understand that legal assistance and relief is open for
anyone, including those without financial resources15 or those who
are unable to speak English.16 In many countries, access to divorce
and custody of one’s children is severely limited, and the law actually

13. See BAUER & RAMÍREZ, supra note 12, at 21–23 (describing the extreme
difficulties faced by immigrant women in the labor force, including discriminatory
and exploitive labor practices, with a focus on women working in the agricultural
industries); JEFFREY S. PASSEL ET AL., URBAN INST. IMMIGRATION STUDIES PROGRAM,
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS:
FACTS AND FIGURES 2 (2004), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000587_undoc_immigrants_facts.pdf (indicating
that immigrant workers, especially undocumented immigrant workers, are paid
considerably less than other workers).
14. See generally TANYA BRODER & JONATHAN BLAZER, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR.,
OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS 3 (2011), available at
http://www.nilc.org/overview-immeligfedprograms.html (listing the public benefits
most noncitizens do not qualify for, including Medicaid, Medicare, the Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP), foster care, and Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF)); see also Fatma E. Marouf, Regrouping America: Immigration Policies
and the Reduction of Prejudice, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 129, 136 (2012) (stating that
undocumented immigrants are not only excluded from most public benefits but that
state laws restrict their access to in-state tuition, home rental, and drivers licenses).
15. See Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for Help
and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 65–66 (2003) [hereinafter Orloff et al.,
Police Response] (suggesting that although many immigrant women come from
countries with corrupt or inept police forces, the immigrants begin to understand
American legal and law enforcement systems the longer they are in the U.S.); Amy
Gottlieb, The Violence Against Women Act: Remedies for Immigrant Victims of Domestic
Violence, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2004, at 14 (noting that many immigrants bring their cultural
perceptions of law enforcement and justice systems—derived from their experiences
in their native countries—with them to the U.S., which may lead them to believe that
American systems are equally corrupt).
16. Lack of English-language skills remains a formidable barrier for immigrant
domestic violence victims seeking legal assistance. See Donna Coker, Shifting Power for
Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1009, 1031–32 (2000) (discussing the problems of poor women of color in securing
domestic violence assistance, noting that “immigrant Latinas who do not speak
English are seriously disadvantaged in the courts, in their encounters with police,
and in the offices of social service agencies”); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1241, 1249 (1991) (stating that language barriers can be an obstacle for
women to access information about shelters and the safety they provide because
shelters often lack language accommodations).
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punishes a parent who leaves the home, even to escape abuse.17 Not
surprisingly, then, immigrant domestic violence victims are at a
distinct disadvantage in their attempts to escape their abusers.
Additionally, an immigrant victim of domestic violence often must
contend with the batterer’s exploitation of her precarious
immigration status. Faced with the batterer’s threats to have her
deported and/or to take her children away from her, a battered
immigrant may very rationally believe that the reasonable course of
action is to succumb to continued abuse.18 Finally, cultural constraints
and dictates, which teach obedience to one’s husband and against
leaving a marriage under any circumstance, may operate against a
battered immigrant’s attempts to escape abusive relationships.19

17. See, e.g., Aili Mari Tripp & Ladan Affi, Domestic Violence in a Cultural Context,
FAM. ADVOC., Fall 2004, at 34 (noting that immigrant women often fear losing their
children due to threats from their husbands); UAE: Spousal Abuse Never a ‘Right’,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/19/uaespousal-abuse-never-right (decrying a decision by the United Arab Emirates Federal
Supreme Court “upholding a husband’s right to ‘chastise’ his wife and children with
physical abuse”). Less egregious yet still troubling examples abound in the United
States. See, e.g., Sandra Park, Shut Up or Get Out: PA City Punishes Domestic Violence
Victims Who Call the Police, ACLU (Apr. 24, 2013, 3:24 PM), https://www.
aclu.org/print/blog/womens-rights-lgbt-rights-racial-justice-criminal-law-reform/
shut-or-get-out-pa-city-punishes (reporting on a Norristown, Pennsylvania ordinance
that punished victims of domestic violence for their repeated “disorderly behavior”
of calling law enforcement after being victimized).
18. See Mary Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources
and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245, 293 (2000) (noting that the fear of being referred to
immigration authorities and the fear of deportation are the primary reasons battered
immigrant women report for not leaving an abusive relationship); Orloff et al., Police
Response, supra note 15, at 64–70 (reporting factors that increase the likelihood of
battered immigrant women accessing police assistance, such as permanent
immigration status, children witnessing the abuse, and acculturation); Michelle
DeCasas, Comment, Protecting Hispanic Women: The Inadequacy of Domestic Violence
Policy, 24 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 56, 70–73 (2003) (describing how strong family
values, distrust of the police, immigrant status, and cultural acceptance of domestic
violence against women often hinders Latinas from seeking police assistance); see
also Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 38 (2009) (“Immigrant
women, particularly those who are undocumented or whose partners are undocumented,
may fear that involvement in the criminal system will lead to deportation, depriving
them of economic, emotional, extended family, or parenting support.”).
19. See, e.g., Felicia E. Franco, Unconditional Safety for Conditional Immigrant Women,
11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 99, 125 (1996) (commenting on the cultural practices that
instruct women to remain with their husbands, even in the face of domestic abuse, so
as to maintain the family structure and reputation); Jacqueline P. Hand & David C.
Koelsch, Shared Experiences, Divergent Outcomes: American Indian and Immigrant Victims
of Domestic Violence, 25 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 185, 191 (2010) (“[U]nlike U.S.-born
women, many women who grew up in a foreign country and come to the United
States as adults often struggle with unique cultural, language, economic, and
informational challenges, which can restrict their ability to recognize and terminate
abusive relationships.”).
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Thus, the complexities that an immigrant domestic violence victim
may face make her choice whether to stay with or leave her abuser
even more difficult. As a literal noncitizen of the country, the
immigrant must contend with the immigration law and policy
regimes in addition to the myriad other hurdles she faces when
contemplating leaving. Thus, in each of these marginalized statuses,
she is presented with obstacles. With an identity that encompasses an
array of these intersecting subordinated characteristics,20 her struggle
to achieve freedom from abuse is heightened.
II. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT: A HISTORY OF FEDERAL
ACTION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Recognizing the particular vulnerabilities of the immigrant
domestic violence victim in the United States, the first comprehensive
federal effort to help victims of violence included provisions
especially for immigrants.21 Indeed, since the inception of VAWA in
1994, immigrant victims of domestic violence have been part of the
purview of the Act. This Part discusses the legislative successes aimed
at helping the community of immigrant domestic violence victims,
focusing on VAWA and its history. The focus of this exploration is on
how these remedies have been successful or have fallen short of their
promises to battered immigrants. This discussion will be explored
more in Part III through the lens of subordination theory and will
comment on the VAWA 2013 reauthorization process.
A. The Immigration Law Focus on Marriage Influenced the History of VAWA
VAWA’s provisions aimed at helping immigrant domestic violence
victims derive from a long history of the interconnection between
immigration law, family law, and, specifically, the governmental
responses to domestic violence. This connection is perhaps most
prevalent in considering the immigration law preference for family
unity through marriage.22 Beginning with the 1945 War Brides Act,23

20. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 16 (discussing the intersection of race and
gender identity in the context of complex and often competing structural, political
and representational interests that compound a woman of color’s marginalization).
21. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, §§ 40,701–40,703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1953–55 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (providing for petitioning rights and suspension of
deportation in certain cases for battered immigrants).
22. See generally Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91
MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2007) (explaining that Congress uses immigration law as a
means of shaping and regulating marriage). The author has also written on this
particular subject. See Olivares, A Final Obstacle, supra note 11, at 167 (listing and
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which allowed members of the armed forced serving abroad to marry
foreign citizens and sponsor their spouses’ immigration to the U.S.,
U.S. immigration policy has supported quick and relatively easy
access to visas for the spouses of U.S. citizens24 and lawful permanent
residents.25 This relatively liberal immigration policy tapered off with
the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986
(IMFA),26 which corresponded to the passage of the equallyrestrictive comprehensive Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) of 1986.27 Operating on what was later deemed to be flawed
data purporting to detail a high number of marriage-based visas
procured through assertions of fraudulent marriages,28 Congress
passed the IMFA to make it more difficult for spouses to immigrate
on the basis of their marriage to a U.S. citizen or LPR. For example,
a hallmark provision of the IMFA required that foreign spouses
sponsored for a family-based visa by their U.S. citizen or LPR
spouse—deemed a joint petition—would depend on their petitioning
spouse during a two-year conditional period after the initial visa
approval29 rather than procure immediate LPR status, as was the
providing an overview of U.S. immigration legislation that encourages U.S. citizens to
marry noncitizens).
23. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-271, 59 Stat. 659 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
24. See Mary L. Sfasciotti & Luanne Bethke Redmond, Marriage, Divorce, and the
Immigration Laws, 81 ILL. B.J. 644, 644 (1993) (indicating that the War Brides Act
helped increase the speed with which noncitizens who married U.S. citizens were
able to immigrate to the U.S.); see also Abrams, supra note 22, at 1637 (suggesting
that Congress has valued “family unification or family reunification” in subsequent
immigration legislation as evidenced by its creation of familial entry categories
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
25. See Sfasciotti & Redmond, supra note 24, at 644 & n.2 (noting that twenty-six
percent of the annual immigration quota was allocated to spouses of LPRs).
26. Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.).
27. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 and 42 U.S.C.).
28. See Sfasciotti & Redmond, supra note 24, at 645 (indicating that even though
credible statistics were not kept or available at the time, a 1983–1984 study suggested
that approximately thirty percent of marriage-based visa petitions were based on
fraudulent marriages and that this information fueled congressional action to stop
visa fraud, resulting in the IMFA, but noting also that the data was later found to be
inaccurate); INS Admits Fraud Survey Not Valid, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1011, 1011–
12 (1989) (explaining that the INS cited to the 1984 survey when addressing
Congress in 1985 even though INS officials knew the survey was flawed); see also
WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42477, IMMIGRATION PROVISIONS OF THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (VAWA) 7 & n.37 (2012) [hereinafter KANDEL CRS
2012] (citing Manwani v. INS, 736 F. Supp. 1367 (W.D.N.C. 1990)) (noting that the
percentage of fraudulent marriage applications was estimated at no more than one
to two percent, which was also reported in a federal court decision); Charles Gordon,
The Marriage Fraud Act of 1986, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 183, 184 (1990) (citing INS
admissions that marriage fraud estimates had no statistical foundation).
29. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments § 2(a).
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previous policy. This tightening of the marriage-based sponsored visa
program created a ripple effect in how immigration law and
implementing policy hindered domestic violence victims from
obtaining immigration relief independently from their abusive
spouses, thus keeping them in abusive marriages.30
In an attempt to remedy some of these problems for immigrant
domestic violence victims created by the IMFA regulations, in the
Immigration Act of 1990 (the 1990 Act)31 and later through VAWA,
Congress amended key provisions of immigration law and policy to
allow for certain types of relief, including waivers from the joint
spousal petition requirement and, in VAWA 1994, a self-petitioning
option to legalize immigration status.32 Recognizing the difficulties,
for example, placed on battered immigrant spouses with the two-year
Conditional Lawful Permanent Residence petitioning process, the
1990 Act provided for a new battered spouse waiver of the joint
petition requirements33 so that battered immigrants did not have to
depend on their abusive spouses for their lawful immigration status.34
Although the implementation of the waiver requirements did not

30. See Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note 11, at 102 (asserting that the IMFA
provisions were harmful against battered immigrants in reiterating the manipulative
power that U.S. citizen spouses had over the victims’ immigration status). The IMFA
contained a waiver provision for battered immigrants. The joint LPR petition
requirement could be waived under IMFA if the noncitizen spouse proved that (1)
extreme hardship would result if the noncitizen were removed or (2) the noncitizen
had entered into the marriage in good faith but had terminated it for good cause
and was not at fault for failing to meet the joint petition requirement. Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments § 2(a); see also KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 24
(indicating that many noncitizens were unable to obtain relief under the joint
petition because their abusers were unlikely to petition for them). Evidence in
support of the 1990 Act provisions amending IMFA note that these waivers were
difficult to obtain. KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 24 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101723, pt. 1, at 51 (1990)).
31. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iv)–(vi) (2012) (authorizing a process for alien
spouses and alien children of U.S. citizens to self-petition for lawful status); 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.2(c) (2014) (detailing the eligibility requirements and procedures for abused
spouses to petition independently for lawful status).
33. Immigration Act of 1990 § 701(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1186a(c)(4)(C)). Under the waiver provisions, the immigrant spouse had to prove
that s/he entered the marriage in good faith, that s/he was not at fault for not
meeting the joint petition requirement, and that during the marriage, s/he was
battered by or was the subject of extreme cruelty perpetuated by the U.S. citizen or
LPR spouse. Id.
34. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, pt. 1, at 78 (1990) (“The purpose of this provision
is to ensure that when the U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse or parent
engages in battering or cruelty against a spouse or child, neither the spouse nor child
should be entrapped in the abusive relationship by the threat of losing their legal
resident status.”).
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happen smoothly,35 this early intervention by Congress provided that
INS adjudicators should err on the side of granting battered spouse
waivers and that such waivers should only be denied in “rare and
exceptional circumstances such as when the foreign national poses a
clear and significant detriment to the national interest.”36
B. The History of VAWA’s Promises to Domestic Violence Victims,
Including Battered Immigrants
1.

VAWA 1994
While reform for battered immigrants was taking place through the
implementation of the 1990 Act’s provisions, Congress was crafting its
most comprehensive federal legislation aimed at eradicating
domestic violence. The present-day VAWA was born in the 101st
Congress in the summer of 1990.37 In the hearings that summer,
victims of domestic violence testified on the tragic personal costs that
violence and sexual assault had taken in their lives, while advocates
and experts who worked with victims of violence discussed the
obstacles that victims faced in leaving relationships and achieving
freedom from their abusive partners.38 On January 21, 1993, Senator
35. See KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 22–23 (citing Martha F. Davis & Janet
M. Calvo, INS Interim Rule Diminishes Protection for Abused Spouses and Children, 68
INTERPRETER RELEASES 665, 668 (1991)) (detailing the controversies surrounding the
evidentiary restrictions on proving the battered spouse waiver cases, including the
concerns by domestic violence advocates that the requirements to have mental
health evaluations to prove “extreme cruelty” were overly burdensome for poor
immigrant women).
Interestingly, many of these same types of onerous
requirements were proposed in VAWA 2013. Compare id. at 21–22 (explaining that
under the Immigration Act of 1990, the foreign national spouse had to provide
reports and affidavits from police, medical professionals, and other officials to
demonstrate support for a waiver), with infra Part II.B.5 (discussing the legislative
history and proposed provisions of VAWA 2013).
36. KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 22 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, pt. 1,
at 78–79). The 1990 Act provided other mechanisms to protect battered immigrant
spouses, including confidentiality provisions and clarifications on what constitutes
“good cause” for terminating the marriage requirements. See id.
37. See generally Women and Violence: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. (1990).
38. See id. In the 102nd Congress, then-Senator Joseph Biden introduced VAWA
as S. 15 and then-Representative Barbara Boxer introduced VAWA as H.R. 1502.
Violence Against Women Act of 1991, H.R. 1502, 102d Cong. (1991); Violence
Against Women Act of 1991, S. 15, 102d Cong. (1991). The Senate Committee on
the Judiciary held hearings on the bill on April 9, 1991 and examined the bill’s civil
rights remedy for gender-motivated crimes. Violence Against Women: Victims of the
System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1–2 (1991)
(statement of Joseph R. Biden, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary) (explaining that
the bill was designed to “comprehensively address violent crimes against women”).
The Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 15 favorably on October 29, 1991. S. REP.
NO. 102-197, pt. II.A., at 35 (1991). In the House, the Subcommittee on Crime and
Criminal Justice held a hearing on H.R. 1502 on February 6, 1992 and reported it
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Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) introduced VAWA in the Senate with
sixty-four bipartisan co-sponsors.39 A House version of VAWA was
introduced on February 24, 1993,40 and the proposed bills were
debated over the next year.41
In efforts to continue the work of the 1990 Act to remedy the
immigration law difficulties faced by battered immigrants, early
versions of the proposed VAWA 1994 legislation expanded on the
provisions aimed at helping immigrant domestic violence victims. In
one Congressional debate, for example, Representative Louise
Slaughter (D-New York) voiced her approval for the “Safe Homes for
Immigrant Women” provisions because, she noted, “For too long,
immigrant women have been forced to remain in destructive
marriages with husbands who beat and abuse them—because they are
entirely dependent on that abusive spouse for their legal status. This
legislation will give abused immigrant wives the right to self-petition
for legal status.”42
On November 16, 1993, the House Subcommittee on Crime and
Criminal Justice considered H.R. 1133, focusing on provisions
regarding the treatment of battered women.43 As one example, the
favorably to the House Committee on the Judiciary. Violence Against Women: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong. (1992).
39. Violence Against Women Act of 1993, S. 11, 103d Cong. (1993).
40. 139 CONG. REC. 3641 (1993) (statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder)
(introducing H.R. 1133).
41. From this earliest introduction of VAWA 1994, politicians from both the
Republican and Democratic parties supported the legislation. See, e.g., 140 CONG.
REC. 23,635 (1994) (statement of Sen. Diane Feinstein) (“What I saw and heard, Mr.
President, was a new kind of bipartisanship.”). Legislators expressed concern and
commitment to finally working to eradicate the scourge of domestic violence,
agreeing with the bill’s author, Senator Biden, who, when he introduced the bill in
the Senate, stated, “We have waited in my view too long, already, to recognize the
horror and the sweep of this violence. . . . We now face a problem that has become
doubly dangerous, as invisible to policymakers as it is terrifying to its victims. Our
blindness costs us dearly.” 139 CONG. REC. 739 (1993) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
42. 139 CONG. REC. 31,301 (1993) (statement of Rep. Louise Slaughter). The
House Committee on the Judiciary demonstrated an appreciation of the hurdles
battered immigrants face in a report on the Violence Against Women Act of 1993
wherein the Committee acknowledged that then-current law “foster[ed] domestic
violence” by giving the abusive citizen or resident spouse total control of the
immigrant spouse’s ability to gain legal status. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26 (1993).
“By including VAWA within this larger crime package, Senator Biden hoped to
facilitate funding for the bill and to avoid separate debates on some of the
controversial provisions of the legislation.” MARY HAWKESWORTH ET AL., CTR. FOR AM.
WOMEN & POLITICS, LEGISLATING BY AND FOR WOMEN: A COMPARISON OF THE 103RD AND
104TH CONGRESSES 18 (2011), available at http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/research/
topics/documents/CongReport103-104.pdf.
43. Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Civil &
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 1 (1993) (statement of
Don Edwards, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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1993 legislation targeted the provision in the 1990 Act that required
battered immigrants who filed a battered spouse waiver of the joint
petitioning requirements on the basis of extreme cruelty to have a
mental health evaluation from a licensed mental health professional
as too onerous of a requirement.44
Congress eventually passed VAWA as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,45 and President Bill
Clinton signed the VAWA into law on September 13, 1994.46 VAWA
represented the first major comprehensive federal action aimed at
eradicating domestic violence in a multi-tiered approach, providing
billions of dollars of government aid while creating agencies and
provisions to help victims and families.47
VAWA 1994 provided much needed remedies for battered
immigrants seeking to regularize their immigration status without the
assistance of their U.S. citizen or LPR batterer spouse. First, VAWA
1994 allowed battered immigrants to self-petition for LPR status or to
waive the joint petition requirement48 if the immigrant victim was the
initial beneficiary of a family-based immigration petition.49 Second,
the 1994 Act lowered the evidentiary standard needed from the
requirement that the petition have an evaluation from a licensed
mental health professional to “any credible evidence” to demonstrate
that the petitioning battered immigrant suffered extreme cruelty.50
44. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(iv) (2014) (interpreting section 216.5 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and stating that all cases of waiver due to extreme
cruelty must be supported by a professional evaluation because “[t]he Service is not
in a position to evaluate testimony regarding a claim of extreme mental cruelty
provided by unlicensed or untrained individuals . . . all waiver applications based
upon claims of extreme mental cruelty must be supported by the evaluation of a
professional recognized by the Service as an expert in the field”). The recognized
professional expert fields are “[l]icensed clinical social workers, psychologists, and
psychiatrists.” Id. § 216.5(e)(3)(vii).
45. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
46. Lynn Rosenthal, 18th Anniversary of the Violence Against Women Act, WHITE
HOUSE (Sept. 17, 2012, 2:18 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/09/17/
18th-anniversary-violence-against-women-act.
47. VAWA did not, however, represent the first measure of governmental
assistance for victims of domestic violence. The 1984 Family Violence Prevention
and Services Act, passed as part of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, is
the precursor to the 1994 VAWA. See Pub. L. No. 98-457, tit. III, 98 Stat. 1749, 1757
(1984) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
48. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 40,701.
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (providing that any citizen with a
qualified relationship to an immigrant may petition for status).
50. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 40,702(a)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The lowering of the evidentiary burden was in
response to the difficulties that victims had in securing the mental health evaluation
from a licensed professional. See, e.g., James A. Jones, The Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments: Sham Marriages or Sham Legislation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 689–90
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Lastly, VAWA 1994 provided that certain battered immigrants would
qualify for suspension of deportation relief.51
The self-petition program provided enormous benefits to
immigrant domestic violence victims. Prior to the self-petition
program, a foreign spouse who could not satisfy the requirements of
the 1990 Act battered spouse waiver provision was dependent on her
LPR or U.S. citizen spouse to sponsor her immigration petition.
VAWA finally provided a mechanism to escape that dependency and,
essentially, to escape the abusive relationship.52
Moreover, the provisions relaxing the evidentiary standard ensured
that VAWA self-petitioners could satisfy the application’s proof
requirements53 by providing credible evidence of the battery or
extreme mental cruelty, rather than the more onerous standards
present in the 1990 Act provisions.54 Such evidence may include
police reports, reports to other service providers, medical records,
and the petitioner’s own affidavit.55
(1997) (alleging that the former evidentiary requirements barred many battered
immigrant women from accessing the waiver); see also KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note
28, at 25 (noting that while some read this language as a repudiation of INS’s
licensed professional requirement, the statute also granted the Attorney General sole
discretion to determine credibility).
51. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 40,703.
Suspension of deportation relief allowed the victim to assert certain exigent
circumstances in support of a petition for agency discretion to allow her not to be
deported, even though she was technically deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a); see also
KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 25 (explaining that VAWA only required
applicants for suspension of deportation to live in the United States for three years
whereas seven years had previously been required).
52. See supra text accompanying note 29 (describing IMFA’s effect of creating the
Conditional Lawful Permanent Residence status for immigrant spouses who had
been married for less than two years to their U.S. citizen or LPR petitioning spouses).
With the new VAWA self-petition process, the foreign spouse no longer had to rely
on the petitioning spouse for the successful completion of her immigration
petition.
Instead, the immigrant victim of domestic violence can apply
independently of her spouse.
53. In a successful application, the self-petitioner must prove that s/he (1)
entered into the marriage in good faith, (2) suffered battery or extreme cruelty at
the hands of his/her spouse, (3) is a person of good moral character, and (4) lived
with her abuser spouse. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A).
54. See supra note 33 (discussing the 1990 Act battered spouse waiver).
55. See Leslye E. Orloff et al., Mandatory U-Visa Certification Unnecessarily
Undermines the Purpose of the Violence Against Women Act’s Immigration Protections and its
“Any Credible Evidence” Rules—A Call for Consistency, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & LAW 619,
630–31 (2010) (noting the types of evidence that victims must include in their
petitions as evidence of each requirement and suggesting that requiring some of this
evidence may force a victim to return to the location where her abuser works or
lives). As advocates for domestic violence victims have countered, however, such
pieces of evidence can be difficult to compile because victims may be fearful to go to
the police or doctors due to various factors, including a deep lack of trust in law
enforcement. See id. at 630; see also Coker, supra note 16, at 1031 (discussing how
political repression in their home countries leads some immigrant Latina women in
the United States to distrust government and law enforcement authorities);
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To be sure, VAWA did not represent a solution for all battered
immigrants as it is limited to those otherwise eligible immigrants who
are or were married to their abusers and whose abusers are U.S.
citizens or LPRs,56 thereby excluding unmarried victims and those
married to abusers who hold other types of immigration status. Yet
despite any shortcomings, the bipartisan political commitment in
VAWA 1994 was a watershed moment in the domestic violence
advocacy movement generally and specifically helped to highlight the
plight of immigrant domestic violence victims.
2.

Anti-immigrant legislation in 1996
Soon after VAWA’s successes and as the range of relief expanded
for immigrant domestic violence victims, changes to the INA through
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA)57 brought new challenges to immigrant communities.
IIRIRA came at a time of heightened anxiety and suspicion of
immigrants and other marginalized communities, including the
poor. IIRIRA was one of various new federal efforts aimed at
decreasing undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits,
which, in turn, sought to decrease the number of undocumented
immigrants in the United States while also clearing the path to
deporting other immigrants already in the country.58 As one example
Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 1257 (asserting that people of color, generally, and
women of color, specifically, are hesitant to invite police intervention into their lives
and thereby infrequently call police when they are subjected to domestic violence).
Similarly, there is a critical scarcity of low-cost, culturally competent legal service and
social service providers available to help immigrant victims of domestic violence. See
Olivares, A Final Obstacle, supra note 11, at 183 (commenting on how the shortage of
legal service providers is just one of the many problems confronting battered
immigrants); see also Coker, supra note 16, at 1018 (suggesting that immigrant victims
of domestic violence may not see the legal system as the most effective way to secure
the help that they need).
56. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1) (providing a detailed outline of eligibility
requirements needed to receive VAWA benefits); see also KANDEL CRS 2012, supra
note 28, at 24 (noting that the VAWA required the self-petitioner to be married to
the abuser and could not have been divorced); Olivares, A Final Obstacle, supra note
11, at 174 (describing factual circumstances that could place a noncitizen’s eligibility
in jeopardy, such as divorce during the conditional period). The eligibility
requirements were changed such that a petitioner can now be divorced from the
abuser, but the divorce must have occurred within two years of the application and
must have been related to the abuse. See 146 CONG. REC. 22,074 (Oct. 11, 2000)
(summarizing the 2000 amendments to VAWA’s eligibility requirements). VAWA
relief is also now available to the parent or child of an abusive U.S. citizen or an LPR.
See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(f) (2014) (outlining the procedural requirements for a
petition for a parent).
57. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
58. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 163 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (limiting federal
public benefits available to noncitizens except in certain circumstances); H.R. REP.
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relevant to the battered immigrant community, IIRIRA replaced the
suspension of deportation process with “[c]ancellation of removal,”59
including for battered immigrants seeking this relief under VAWA.
Pursuant to a new cap on the number of people eligible for
cancellation of removal relief, not all VAWA petitioners would qualify
for relief60 though there were some exceptions to the cap for certain
VAWA self-petitioners.61
That same year, Congress also passed the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”),62
which prohibited most immigrants from receiving most types of
federally funded public aid benefits.63
Although PRWORA
contained the Family Violence Option (“FVO”), a provision to
accommodate the particular needs of victims of domestic violence,64
the FVO did not solve the issues concerning the tight restrictions
against the provision of federal aid to most immigrant victims of
domestic violence.65
NO. 104-651, at 6 (1996) (referring to welfare as an “immigration magnet” during a
report on welfare and Medicaid reform); see also RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33809, NONCITIZEN ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC ASSISTANCE:
POLICY OVERVIEW AND TRENDS 2 (2012) (noting the negative impact of the 1996
welfare reform law, known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, on noncitizens’ eligibility for public assistance). See generally
Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status,
Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1512–18 (1995) [hereinafter
Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration] (highlighting the tense immigration politics
in the 1990s that blamed undocumented immigrants for “sapping public benefits
and bankrupting state and local governments”).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1); see KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 26
(distinguishing between the self-petitioning and cancellation of removal procedures
by noting that cancellation of removal applications are allowed only during removal
proceedings before an immigration judge and that children cannot be included in a
battered parent’s petition for cancellation of removal).
60. Under the pre-IIRIRA suspension section, the Attorney General was limited
to cancelling the removal and adjusting the status or suspending deportation and
adjusting the status of no more than 4,000 noncitizens each fiscal year. 8 U.S.C.
1229b(e)(1).
61. See KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 26 n.142 (clarifying that the cap of
4,000 noncitizens did not apply to certain noncitizens, such as petitioners for
suspension of deportation under VAWA).
62. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
63. Id. § 401. See generally BRODER & BLAZER, supra note 14 (providing an overview
of the impact of 1996 welfare laws, which barred even LPRs from receiving assistance
under major federal benefits programs).
64. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103(a)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)); see also Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note 11, at 125
(explaining that the FVO “encourage[s] states to screen Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (“TANF”) applicants for domestic abuse” to determine if the
applicants qualify for benefits).
65. See Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note 11, at 125–26 (noting that, although
IIRIRA somewhat expanded the eligibility for federally-funded public benefits by
including certain abused undocumented immigrant women and children who could
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These new laws, along with other challenges to immigrants in an
anti-immigrant political and social environment,66 made securing
immigration relief more difficult for battered immigrants. Such
efforts eroded the gains VAWA 1994 made for the community of
battered immigrants and jeopardized the safety of their families.
3.

VAWA 2000
In response to advocacy surrounding the immigration problems of
the 1996 legislation,67 Congress reauthorized a revamped VAWA in
2000 (“VAWA 2000”)68 as part of the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000 (“TVPA”).69 VAWA 2000 contained
an important, groundbreaking piece of federal legislation aimed at
helping battered immigrants: the Battered Immigrant Women
Protection Act of 2000 (“BIWPA”).70 The BIWPA provided critical
immigration law provisions intending to assist immigrant victims of
domestic violence,71 including the establishment of the U visa for
immigrant victims of crimes.72
now acquire benefits on their own behalf, other limitations in the public benefits
guidelines for certain immigrants continued to limit the usefulness of government
aid for these victims).
66. See, e.g., Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration, supra note 58, at 1562
(detailing the requirements of a State of California ballot proposition requiring
social service agencies that provide counseling to battered women to report any
suspected unlawful immigration status to the INS, the State Director of Social
Services, and the California Attorney General).
67. See Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note 11, at 143–44 (acknowledging that laws
passed after VAWA 1994 “effectively barred access to VAWA protection for many
immigrants”); see also KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 26 (stating that 1996
IIRIRA imposed barriers for battered spouses seeking to remain in the U.S.).
68. Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
69. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
70. Pub. L. No. 106-386, tit. V, 114 Stat. 1518 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
71. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(v)(II) (2012) (adjustment of status); id.
§ 1227(a)(7)(A) (waivers for cancellation of removal and suspension of deportation);
id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv) (motions to reopen removal proceedings); see also KANDEL
CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 26 (stating that the BIWPA created exceptions to the
rules related to cancellation of removal, suspension of deportation, time
limitations on the motions to reopen removal proceedings, and adjustment of
status); Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note 11, at 145 (noting that the VAWA 2000
amendments removed barriers for abused noncitizens to access VAWA protection).
72. Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act § 1513 (establishing the purposes
and requirements of the then-new U visa). Congress created the U visa in 2000 with
the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act. The interim
rule establishing the new visa finally became effective on October 17, 2007. New
Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for “U” Nonimmigrant
Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014 (Sept. 17, 2007) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 214,
248, 274a, 299). The U visa protects noncitizen victims who report crimes to law
enforcement, including domestic violence and sexual assault, and assists in ensuing
investigations and prosecutions. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U). U.S. Citizenship and
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Representative Janice D. Schakowsky (D-Illinois) introduced the
BIWPA of 1999 as H.R. 3083.73 The bill had 112 co-sponsors.74 In
introducing the bill, Representative Schakowsky pushed for quick
movement on the legislation, highlighting the importance of
increased protections for battered immigrant women in light of the
detrimental effects of IIRIRA:
For immigrant women, who often have no family support and
whose immigration status is tied to the abusers, it is even more
difficult. In more ways than one, they are held hostage by their
abusers. . . . We must act now . . . . [I]t is wrong to stand idly by as
battered women and their children are forced to choose between a
black eye and broken arm or a one-way ticket out of the country.75

VAWA 2000 passed with broad bipartisan support and with
apparently little controversy over the provisions aimed at immigrant
communities. The House passed the legislation with a 371-1 vote,
and the Act received a unanimous positive vote in the Senate.76
Perhaps most importantly for immigrant victims of domestic
violence, the U visa is for victims of crime who cooperate with law
enforcement in the investigation of the crime and the prosecution of
the perpetrator.77 An eligible immigrant with any type of immigration

Immigration Services (USCIS) may issue no more 10,000 U-1 visas per year. 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.14(d)(1) (2014). Once the 10,000 cap is met, USCIS places applicants on a
waitlist and issues them a “deferred action,” a form of interim relief that allows
employment authorization and deferred action status to their eligible derivative
family members. Id. § 214.14(d)(2).
73. Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 3083, 106th Cong.
(1999); see 145 CONG. REC. 26,577 (1999) (statement of Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky)
(justifying the need for the BIWPA based on the unique dangers that battered
immigrant women face, such as the threat of deportation).
74. H.R. 3083.
75. 145 CONG. REC. 26,577 (1999) (statement of Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky); see
also 146 CONG. REC. 22,070 (2000) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (stating that
BIWPA effectively removed any immigration barriers for abused noncitizens when
seeking to flee an abusive citizen or LPR).
76. LISA A. SEGHETTI & JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42499, THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT: OVERVIEW, LEGISLATION, AND FEDERAL FUNDING 9 n.48
(2012); see also H.R. 3244 (106th): Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/106-2000/h518 (last
visited Dec. 19, 2014) (listing Representative Mark Sanford of South Carolina as the
only member of Congress to vote against VAWA 2000).
77. Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. of Operations, Citizenship
& Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Dir., Vt. Serv. Ctr. (Oct. 8,
2003). Qualifying crimes for a U visa include abduction, abusive sexual contact,
blackmail, domestic violence, extortion, false imprisonment, genital mutilation,
felonious assault, being held hostage, prostitution, rape, sexual assault, sexual
exploitation, slave trading, torture, trafficking, and other related crimes. Battered
Immigrant Women Protection Act § 1513(b)(3). VAWA 2013 expanded the list of
eligible crimes for the U visa to include stalking. See infra text accompanying note 106.
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status can petition for the U visa.78 As prescribed in VAWA 2000,
there is an annual cap of 10,000 U visas for primary victims of crime
in any fiscal year.79 The U visa is an important route to lawful
immigration status for victims who are not married to their abusers or
whose spouses are not U.S. citizens or have LPR status.80 The U visa is
a nonimmigrant visa, which allows the crime victim applicant to
remain lawfully in the United States in that status for up to four
years81 and authorizes the U visa holder to work lawfully.82 To qualify,
the U visa applicant must cooperate with law enforcement in the
investigation of the crime and/or the prosecution of the alleged
perpetrator of the crime.83 To demonstrate this requirement, the U
visa application must contain a certification letter from a law
enforcement official, attesting to the U visa applicant’s cooperation.84
This condition was incorporated into the new visa process to prevent
fraudulent applications for the visa,85 and the certification letter thus
stands as a proxy for the genuineness of the applicant’s status as a
victim. But this certification requirement proves too burdensome for
many immigrant victims because of their fears and distrust of the
police and court system.86 More practically, for some victims,
78. The statutory eligibility requirements provide that the victim must (1) have
suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of
one or more of the criminal activities listed in the statute, (2) possess information
concerning the criminal activity, (3) be helpful, have been helpful, or be likely to be
helpful to a federal, state, or local investigation or prosecution of a form of listed
criminal activity, and (4) obtain law enforcement certification from an official, as
described in the statute, and the criminal activity must have violated the laws of the
United States or have occurred in the United States or one of its possessions or
territories. See Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act § 1513(b)–(c).
79. Id. § 1513(c). Importantly, the statute did not establish a cap on the
number of U visas for the derivative spouses, children, or parents of the primary U
visa applicant. Id.
80. See Amy M. Wax, Relief Under The Violence Against Women Act, in IMMIGRATION
PRACTICE MANUAL § 9, § 9.6.1 (Michael D. Greenberg ed., 2012) (explaining that U
visas provide noncitizens options to VAWA relief that otherwise would be
unavailable). Moreover, the U visa contains a more flexible method for calculating
continuous physical presence, a necessary qualification to establish certain
immigration remedies, and waives the continuous physical presence requirements
for certain applicants. See id. § 9.6.9. These are just some of the welcome inclusions
and amendments to the INA focused on assistance to battered immigrants.
81. Id. § 9.6.1.
82. Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act § 1513(c) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1184(p)(3)(B) (2012)).
83. Id. § 1513(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1)).
84. Id. § 1513(c) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(3)(A)).
85. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION
RESOURCE GUIDE 15 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
dhs_u_visa_certification_guide.pdf [hereinafter DHS U VISA RESOURCE GUIDE].
86. See Orloff et al., Police Response, supra note 15, at 68 (highlighting that many
immigrant victims of domestic violence are deterred from seeking legal or social
service assistance for fear of immigration consequences).
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procuring the law enforcement certification letter can be
administratively or geographically prohibitive.87
Like the VAWA self-petition process and related avenues of relief,88
the U visa holder is eligible to adjust to LPR status after meeting
certain conditions89 and thus is potentially on a path to U.S.
citizenship.90 Unlike the VAWA remedies,91 however, the U visa offers
a path to immigration status stability without the need to be married
to or divorced from a U.S. citizen or LPR spouse. Thus, the U visa
was a welcome and necessary benefit for many battered immigrants.92
Yet, as the U visa became an important tool to help more battered
immigrants, the annual cap of 10,000 U visas quickly proved to be
insufficient to meet the need. Thus, and as discussed below, the
increase in the number of U visas available each year became an
important advocacy point for immigrant activists in the VAWA 2013
reauthorization debate.93
4.

VAWA 2005
VAWA was again up for Congressional reauthorization in 2005. In
VAWA 2005, the provisions aimed at immigrant victims of domestic
violence continued to be a part of the proposed legislation. Various
87. See KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 14 n.80 (noting that those who live in
areas with few immigrants or areas sparsely populated face difficulties in obtaining a
certified letter). Critics of the certification letter process note that the defendant in
the underlying criminal prosecution is able to attack the victim’s testimony by
asserting that the victim is motivated to provide false testimony in exchange for the U
visa immigration relief. See, e.g., State v. Valle, 298 P.3d 1237, 1240 (Or. Ct. App.
2013) (en banc) (holding that evidence pertaining to whether a party applied for a
U visa on the basis of the alleged abuse currently under consideration in prosecution
proceedings was relevant impeachment evidence).
88. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text (describing the VAWA selfpetition, cancellation of removal, and battered spouse waivers).
89. People with U visas can adjust to LPR status if they have (1) lived in the
United States for at least three continuous years since the grant of the U visa, (2)
agreed to continue to assist law enforcement, and (3) demonstrated that family unity
or the public interest justifies their continued presence in the United States. Battered
Immigrant Women Protection Act § 1513(f); see also KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note
28, at 33 (outlining the adjustment of status requirements for U visa holders).
90. See Elizabeth M. McCormick, Rethinking Indirect Victim Eligibility for U NonImmigrant Visas to Better Protect Immigrant Families and Communities, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 587, 595 (2011) (indicating that the U visa created a second category of
nonimmigrant visas available to noncitizens that allow victims of violent crimes to stay
in the United States as long as the noncitizen cooperates with the investigation and
prosecution of the offender).
91. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (providing immigrant status to those who
may self-petition, which includes only those who are married to a U.S. citizen or LPR).
92. See KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 33 (noting that USCIS approved
25,986 U visas for victims between fiscal years 2009 and 2011 and an additional
19,755 visas for the qualifying family members of U visa holders during that same
time period).
93. See infra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
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versions of the reauthorizing legislation were introduced in the
House and Senate, each containing provisions for immigrant victims.94
Members of Congress again spoke passionately about the need for VAWA
to embrace the particular needs of immigrant victims of violence.95
VAWA 2005 passed Congress and became Public Law 109-162 on
January 5, 2006. As in previous versions of VAWA, VAWA 2005
garnered broad bipartisan support. It passed the House with a 415-4
vote, and the Senate again unanimously passed the bill.96 Particularly
relevant to immigrant victims of domestic violence, VAWA 2005
exempted VAWA self-petitioners from (1) penalties imposed for
overstaying grants of voluntary departure if the overstay was due to
abuse97 and (2) numerical limits on motions to reopen relief
applications for cancellation of removal or suspension of
94. Representative Mark Green (R-Wisconsin) introduced H.R. 2876, the
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2005, on June 14, 2005 with fifteen
cosponsors. H.R. 2876, 109th Cong. (2005). Similarly, Representative Zoe Lofgren
(D-California) introduced H.R. 3171, the VAWA 2005 Reauthorization Act, on June
30, 2005 with 112 cosponsors. H.R. 3171, 109th Cong. (2005). These proposals
eventually became part of section 224 of H.R. 3402, the Violence Against Women
and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, which was introduced by
Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-Wisconsin) on July 22, 2005 with six
cosponsors of its own. H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. (2005). Senator Joseph Biden (DDelaware) introduced S. 1197, the Violence Against Women Act of 2005, in the
Senate on June 8, 2005 with eleven cosponsors. S. 1197, 109th Cong. (2005). On
December 16, 2005, H.R. 3402 passed the Senate. 151 CONG. REC. 28,867 (2005).
On December 17, 2005, the House agreed to Senate amendments of H.R. 3402, and
the bill passed the House. 151 CONG. REC. 29,337 (2005). The Act became Public
Law 109-162 on January 5, 2006. Violence Against Women Department of Justice
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pennsylvania)
introduced S. 3693, a bill to make technical corrections to the Violence Against
Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, on July 19, 2006.
S. 3693, 109th Cong. (2005). This became Public Law 109-271. Act of Aug. 12, 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-271, 120 Stat. 750 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
and 42 U.S.C.).
95. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 21,489 (2005) (statement of Rep. Hilda Solis)
(noting that public education efforts regarding domestic violence should discuss root
issues such as cultural differences, linguistic differences, and immigration issues);
151 CONG. REC. 15,353 (2005) (statement of Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky) (“If we are
to stop violence against women, all victims need protection and assistance without
regard to their immigration status. Escaping domestic violence can be especially
difficult for immigrant women and their children. The threat of deportation,
cultural and language barriers, lack of a work permit and limited access to legal and
social services may make immigrant victims of domestic violence more dependent on
their abusive spouses.”); see also 152 CONG. REC. E2607 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2005)
(statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.) (emphasizing the strong history of protections
for victims of domestic violence since 1994, which repeatedly have ensured that
victims are accorded the opportunity to file VAWA-related immigration relief before
an immigration judge).
96. SEGHETTI & BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 9 n.48.
97. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 825, 119 Stat. 2960, 3064 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)); KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 30.
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deportation.98 Moreover, VAWA 2005 incorporated employment
authorization benefits for certain victims of domestic violence,
including the spouses of people in the country temporarily for
employment purposes.99 In a nod to perceptions of fraud through
the VAWA self-petitioning process, VAWA 2005 also included
provisions aimed at reducing immigration fraud by prohibiting a
VAWA self-petitioner or a U visa holder from petitioning for
immigration status for the abuser.100 Importantly, and as evidence of
the broad support for the general plight of racial and ethnic minority
victims, including immigrant victims, VAWA 2005 survived proposed
amendments that would have stripped the law of its focus on such
marginalized populations.101 VAWA 2005 specified that benefits
should especially serve “Underserved Populations,” a definition that
includes “populations underserved because of geographic location,
underserved racial and ethnic populations, populations underserved
because of special needs (such as language barriers, disabilities,
alienage status, or age), and any other population determined to be
underserved by the Attorney General or by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, as appropriate.”102 Thus, the VAWA provisions
aimed at helping immigrant victims of violence remained strong.
5.

VAWA 2013
In sum, since the original 1994 version and through its subsequent
successful reauthorizations in 2000 and 2005, VAWA has contained
provisions that benefited immigrant victims of domestic violence.
What made the struggle for VAWA reauthorization in 2012–2013
unique was the vociferousness of the debate surrounding new
proposals that expanded benefits for immigrants and other victims of
domestic violence who are members of marginalized communities,
including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals
98. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005 § 825.
99. See id. § 814(c); see also Julie E. Dinnerstein, Options for Immigrant Victims of
Domestic Violence, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 482, 506 (Richard J.
Link et al. eds., 2007) (explaining that there are employment authorization benefits
specifically designated for abused spouses).
100. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005 § 814(e); KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 30.
101. See 151 CONG. REC. 21,489 (2005) (statement of Rep. Hilda Solis) (“Just this
morning, I learned that the manager’s amendment to today’s VAWA reauthorization
bill strikes the language ‘racial and ethnic minorities’ from the definition of
underserved communities. After all the bipartisan work that we have been
conducting . . . , I am outraged that at the last minute, Republican leadership is
shortchanging women of color who are victims of domestic violence.”).
102. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005 § 3.
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and Native Americans living on tribal lands. The aggressive fight
against benefits for these communities marked the VAWA 2013 battle
as particularly politically volatile.103
To be sure, VAWA 2013 began its legislative journey just like its
previous iterations. On November 30, 2011, Senators Patrick Leahy
(D-Vermont) and Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) introduced VAWA as S.
1925, with Leahy declaring that “[t]he Violence Against Women Act
has been successful because it has consistently had strong bipartisan
support for nearly two decades.
Today, we build on that
104
foundation.”
Relevant to the immigrant community,105 this version
of the bill included new provisions that provided additional
protections, such as (1) requiring additional background checks of
U.S. citizens and LPRs petitioning for their foreign national fiancées
or fiancés to flag potentially abusive relationships, (2) expanding
eligibility for “VAWA coverage to derivative children whose selfpetitioning parent died during the [immigration] petition process,”
(3) exempting self-petitioners, U visa petitioners, and other battered
foreign nationals from being classified as inadmissible for
immigration status despite potential public charge findings, (4)
adding stalking to the list of crimes for U visa eligibility, and (5)
increasing the U visa cap from 10,000 annually to 15,000.106
In the House, Representative Sandy Adams (R-Florida) introduced
a companion version of VAWA, H.R. 4970, on April 27, 2012107
without a Democratic co-sponsor. H.R. 4970 contained many of the

103. See Erika Eichelberger, Blocking VAWA, the GOP Keeps Up the War on Women,
THE NATION (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/171977/gop-blocksvawa (noting that while VAWA had been renewed with new protections without
much opposition every five years since it was first introduced in 1994, the House and
Senate “squabble[ed]” in 2013 over provisions related to immigrants, members of
the LGBT community, and Native Americans).
104. 157 CONG. REC. S8071 (2011) (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Patrick J. Leahy).
105. The bill contained numerous other new provisions focused on federal grant
programs, criminal penalties, terminology revisions, and other marginalized
communities. See SEGHETTI & BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 11–12.
106. KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 12. The provisions also prohibited
international marriage brokers from marketing about any potential spouse under the
age of eighteen, allowed U visa petitioners under the age of twenty-one and the
derivative children of adult U visa petitioners from aging out of U visa eligibility if
they reached the age of twenty-one after beginning the petitioning process, and
allowed conditional LPRs married to U.S. citizens or LPRs who qualified for U visas
to obtain hardship waivers to remove their conditional status. Id.
107. See SEGHETTI & BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 10 (outlining the other versions
of the bill and amendments that were introduced throughout the VAWA 2013
legislative journey).
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same helpful provisions of S. 1925108 but also included provisions that
would have been harmful to immigrant victims of domestic violence
if enacted. In particular, H.R. 4970 contained provisions that, inter
alia, would have (1) allowed the alleged abuser to submit “credible
evidence” to rebut a petition, (2) raised the burden of proof for a
petitioner from “any credible evidence” to “clear and convincing
evidence,” (3) eliminated the provision that allows U visa recipients
to be eligible for LPR status after three years in U visa status, and (4)
changed the grant of the U visa to a temporary status valid only
during the period when the related crime is under active
investigation or prosecution.109
Importantly, and relevant to this discussion of marginalized
identities in the political process, both versions of the 2012 Senate
and House bills included provisions that focused on benefitting—or
further marginalizing—other vulnerable communities, in particular
LGBT and Native American people. Indeed, one of the issues that
drew the most controversy was the proposal in S. 1925 that afforded
tribal courts jurisdiction over domestic violence claims made by tribal
members against non-Native Americans on tribal land.110 The
proposal also extended the power of a tribal court to issue and to
enforce protection orders in domestic violence proceedings
occurring on tribal land.111 Previous versions of VAWA gave only the
federal government authority to prosecute non-Native American
defendants accused of committing acts of domestic violence against
tribal members.112
In response to the federal government’s
continued disinclination to prosecute such cases, however, advocates
for tribal victims of domestic violence pushed for prosecutorial
authority to be placed with tribal courts.113
108. H.R. 4970 included the first seven of the provisions listed in the text
describing the immigrant-relevant provisions of S. 1925. Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2012, H.R. 4970, 112th Cong. (2012).
109. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, TALKING POINTS FOR H.R. 4970 (2012); see
also KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 15–16 (outlining H.R. 4970’s major
elements). During a later markup of the bill in committee, H.R. 4970 was amended
to (1) remove the requirement that U visa applicants report the related crime within
sixty days of the offense and (2) remove a provision that the statute of limitations for
prosecuting the related crime had not lapsed by the time that law enforcement
certified the U visa applicant’s cooperation in the investigation or prosecution. H.R.
REP. NO. 112-480, pt. 1, at 244 (2012).
110. S. 1925, 112th Cong. § 904 (2012).
111. Id. § 905.
112. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 901(6), 119 Stat. 2960, 3078 (2006) (recognizing the
federal government’s special trust responsibility toward tribal governments).
113. See NAT’L CONG. FOR AM. INDIANS, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
REAUTHORIZATION ACT—S.1925: TITLE IX: SAFETY FOR INDIAN WOMEN 1 (2012),
available at http://www.ncai.org/attachments/PolicyPaper_aOaNWvmbuDVHyJLuX
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Although a deep review of the reach of these provisions is beyond
the scope of this Article, the inclusion and emphasis on increased
protections for these similarly subordinated victims of domestic
violence further burdened the legislative success of VAWA 2013
beyond the renewed and increased emphasis on the immigrantspecific provisions.114 As Representative Sandy Adams summarized in
voicing her opposition to the inclusion of provisions aimed at
protecting immigrant, Native American, and LGBT victims, “[w]e’re
still in the drafting phase, but I will tell you we are not going to be
looking at the controversial issues that will detract from what is
actually VAWA.”115 The Senate Democrats remained steadfast in their
support for the expansive provisions in S. 1925, with Senator Patty
Murray (D-Washington) even espousing, “I’m not willing to pass a
Violence Against Women bill into law by throwing out the provisions
and throwing under the bus Native American women and LGBT
members and immigrants who have stood up and fought hard . . . .”116
jgMFbPZRlNiRXkixCAraUNsEsbJzhSwJSl_Tribal%20VAWA_Backgrounder.pdf (noting
that many cases go uninvestigated and, therefore, arguing that local governments
should be provided jurisdiction to ensure that perpetrators do not go unpunished
and violence does not escalate).
114. See, e.g., Alizabeth Newman, Reflections on VAWA’s Strange Bedfellows: The
Partnership Between the Battered Immigrant Women’s Movement and Law Enforcement, 42 U.
BALT. L. REV. 229, 255 (2013) (stating that VAWA 2013 did not enjoy the bipartisan
support characteristic of prior versions of VAWA because of the VAWA 2013
provisions focusing on LGBT, tribal, and undocumented immigrant victims); Jessica
Reynolds, GOP Hearts Women?
Not Exactly, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 6, 2013)
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-06/opinion/ct-perspec-0306-women20130306_1_transgender-victims-house-republicans-violence-against-women-act
(acknowledging that the new tribal provisions were among the most contentious and
created a divide); Amanda Terkel, Violence Against Women Act Becomes Partisan Issue,
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/violence-againstwomen-act_n_1273097.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2012, 5:33 PM) (reporting that
VAWA 2013 passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on a party-line vote—
“the first time VAWA legislation did not receive bipartisan backing”—because
some conservative organizations had objected to the VAWA 2013 provisions
designed to specifically protect LGBT individuals, undocumented noncitizens, and
Native Americans).
115. Molly K. Hooper, House GOP to Move Less ‘Controversial’ Version of Violence
Against Women Act, THE HILL (Apr. 25, 2012, 7:21 PM), http://thehill.com/
homenews/house/223719-house-gop-to-keep-controversial-issues-out-of-their-violenceagainst-women-act (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. See Laura Bassett, Patty Murray: I’d Prefer No VAWA Bill to House Version,
HUFFINGTON POST, www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/26/patty-murray-vawa_n_
1627906.html (last updated June 26, 2012, 4:42 PM). Democratic leaders and
supporters of VAWA railed against Republican members’ stalling of VAWA due,
ostensibly, to the bill’s proposal that would allow Native American tribes to prosecute
non-Native American people accused of committing acts of domestic violence on
tribal lands. House Leader Eric Cantor defended the delays, saying, “We want to
protect the women who are subject to abuse on tribal lands. . . . Unfortunately there
are issues that don’t directly bear on that that have come up, that have complicated
it.” Lauren Smith, Cantor Pledges Domestic Violence Law Is an Early House Priority, ROLL
CALL POL’Y (Feb. 6, 2013, 2:56 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted). Members
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Moreover, during these legislative debates, critics of the proposed
VAWA commented about how the proposed additions to VAWA
contravened the history of VAWA bipartisan support. In a debate on
S. 1925, Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) noted that “[s]ince its
original enactment in 1994, the Violence Against Women Act has
been reauthorized twice by unanimous consent, under both
Democratic and Republican leadership,” while also opining that
Republican disapproval of the proposed bill does not amount to a
“war on women”117 as VAWA proponents argued.118 Indeed, by early
2012, VAWA advocates began to understand the extent of the
controversy over the inclusion of provisions benefiting marginalized
and vulnerable communities in the proposed VAWA.119 Such fears
were informed by legislative debates and public comments, in which
some legislators cautioned that the expansion of VAWA provisions
benefitting marginalized populations was too far-reaching. For
example, Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), who led the Republican
fight against VAWA reauthorization in 2012–2013, remarked that
Democrats were playing political games by including provisions in the
bill that they knew would not garner Republican support—a move,
he argued, that would eventually halt VAWA’s reauthorization.120
Senator Grassley argued that the immigrant-friendly provisions of S.
1925 were bad policy and amounted to fiscal irresponsibility.121 In

called out these tactics as attempts to stymie VAWA due to its expanded benefits for
marginalized populations. See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. S482 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013)
(statement of Sen. Patricia Murray) (“They can either appease those on the far right
of their caucus, who would turn battered women away from care, or they can stand
with Democrats, moderate Republicans, and the many millions of Americans who
believe that who a person loves, where they live, or their immigration status, should
not determine whether they are protected from violence in this country. . . . Too
many women have been left vulnerable while House Republican Leaders have played
politics.”); 159 CONG. REC. S479 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. Harry
Reid) (“Despite overwhelming evidence that this legislation saves lives, House
Republican leaders used procedural gimmicks and stalling tactics to block its
reauthorization. I would remind Leader Cantor and his Republican colleagues of
the seriousness of the delay.”).
117. 158 CONG. REC. S2750 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. John McCain).
118. See, e.g., Eichelberger, supra note 103 (demonstrating that Republican
changes to the Senate version of VAWA harm immigrant women in many ways).
119. See, e.g., Adam Serwer, Republicans Are Blocking the Violence Against Women Act:
Here’s Why, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 20, 2012, 6:00 AM) (acknowledging some Republicans’
reasons for attempting to block VAWA reauthorization were that the proposed bill
included provisions to protect LGBT persons, immigrants, and Native Americans).
120. See 158 CONG. REC. S2762 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. Charles
Grassley) (noting that the new provisions were not discussed during the Senate
Judiciary Committee hearing).
121. See id. at S2763 (asserting that the new bill will increase the national deficit by
one hundred million dollars).
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particular, Senator Grassley rallied against the increase of the cap of
available U visas, as proposed in S. 1925, stating:
We have caps for a reason. The U.S. can’t take everybody who
comes to our shores, as much as many would like to. Caps are a
way to control the flow of people. . . . Moreover, increasing the cap
on U visas will likely increase the costs to taxpayers. I’d be
interested to know how much the increase in the numerical cap
would cost the government and the American people.122

Securing an increase in the U visa cap was of great importance for
immigrant advocates in this VAWA reauthorization due to procedural
and administrative problems that had had severe effects on the
effectiveness of the visa. VAWA 2000 created the U visa, but the
implementing regulations governing the U visa application and
procedures were not issued until 2007, and the government did not
start granting actual visas until December 2008.123 This delay created
a large buildup of U visa applications, which would have been
alleviated with the process contemplated in S. 1925. In particular, S.
1925 would have raised the annual U visa cap from 10,000 to 15,000
only if there were unused visas from the 2006–2011 allotments that
could be “recapture[d]” and provided to those U visa applicants still
waiting for an available visa due to the previous backlog.124
Despite this “sunset” provision for the increase in the number of
available U visas, VAWA reauthorization opponents fought to block
the increase in the cap due to supposed rampant immigration fraud.
Senator Grassley argued that caps are “a stop-gap measure against
fraud.”125
Indeed, legislators had evinced concern over the
122. Press Release, Prepared Statement of Senator Chuck Grassley, Judiciary
Committee Executive Business Meeting: Violence Against Women Act, Nominations
(Feb. 2, 2012), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/print/news/newsreleases/judiciary-committee-executive-business-meeting [hereinafter Press Release,
Senator Grassley on VAWA].
123. Immigration Provisions of S. 1925: Myths v. Facts, NAT’L TASK F. TO END SEXUAL
& DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://4vawa.org/4vawa/immigrationprovisions-of-s-1925-myths-v-fact (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
124. Id. As the Congressional Research Service noted in a May 15, 2012 report on
the VAWA immigration provisions:
The additional visas, if required, would be recaptured from the balance of
unused U visas not issued to victims between 2006 and 2011 . . . . Because
regulations to implement the U visa were not issued until late 2008, U visas
were not issued between 2006 and 2008, creating an unused balance of 30,000
U visas for those years. Between 2009 and 2011, 25,986 U visas were issued,
leaving an additional unused balance of 4,014 for those three years. The total
unused balance of 34,014 (30,000 plus 4,014), divided by 5,000 additional
visas per year mandated by S. 1925, suggests that the increased annual quota
of U visas would last for roughly seven years. S. 1925 mandates that the 5,000
visa increase each year would sunset once this balance was used up.
KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 12 n.73.
125. Press Release, Senator Grassley on VAWA, supra note 122.

OLIVARES.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

BATTERED BY LAW

2/3/2015 8:15 PM

259

expansiveness of the immigration provisions and the possibility of
fraud concerns.126 Senator Grassley remarked that “VAWA is meant
to protect victims of violence. It shouldn’t be an avenue to expand
immigration law or to give additional benefits to people here
unlawfully.”127 He further cautioned that VAWA must be crafted so
that its benefits are not manipulated by foreign criminals and “con
artists” as a pathway to U.S. citizenship.128
Notably, however, and similar to the prior misplaced concerns
about supposed extensive marriage fraud to secure immigration
benefits,129 there has never been proof that fraud in VAWA or U visa
claims is widespread. A 2012 Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Report on VAWA noted that there is limited empirical evidence to
support the notion that VAWA provides dishonest immigrants
opportunities to circumvent U.S. immigration laws.130 In the report,
CRS also noted that “consolidation of VAWA petition adjudications in
[one Department of Homeland Security adjudicatory unit] was
intended to . . . prevent fraud by assigning adjudications to a unit of
specialists in domestic violence cases who could efficiently discern
fraudulent petitions, fairly adjudicate legitimate petitions, and protect
victims from accidental violations of confidentiality.”131 Similarly, the
law enforcement certification requirements of the U visa serve to
protect against fraudulent applications for the visa.132 As one
immigrant advocate noted, the high demand for and oversubscription

126. These concerns were highlighted in hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, including in testimony by a U.S. citizen whose immigrant husband
allegedly falsely accused her of domestic violence and who spoke about the
difficulties that accusation wrought. See The Violence Against Women Act: Building on
17 Years of Accomplishments, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 12–
14 (2011) (statement of Julie Poner) (recounting her husband’s continued threats of
abducting her children).
127. Press Release, Senator Grassley on VAWA, supra note 122.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
130. KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, summary at 2; see also Olivares, A Final
Obstacle, supra note 11, at 199–200 & n.242 (noting it is unlikely that the change in
policy will lead to immigrants fraudulently obtaining relief and arguing that this is
not a legitimate basis for refusing support).
131. KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 13 n.76; see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS OF
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT UNIT AT THE USCIS VERMONT SERVICE CENTER:
REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2010) (recognizing that a permanent staff “furthers the
mission and goals of USCIS to provide accurat[e], consisten[t], uniform[], and
reliab[le]” results for battered immigrants).
132. See generally DHS U VISA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 85 (explaining that
eligible victims can obtain nonimmigrant status if certain requirements are met).
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of the U visa is not evidence of fraud, but, rather, that the U visa
meets its purpose as an effective law enforcement mechanism.133
Despite the fervent controversy surrounding the proposed VAWA,
the Senate passed S. 1925 with a vote of 68-31, which included the
approval of fifteen Republican Senators.134 Notably, this approved
version of S. 1925 kept the increase in the number of available U
visas,135 one of the principle measures sought by immigration
advocates. But the progress of S. 1925 effectively stopped there: the
House of Representatives declined to pass the bill,136 and it died when
the 112th Congress recessed. Similarly, H.R. 4970, which kept the
detrimental provisions against immigrants,137 passed the House of
Representatives but did not pass the Senate.138
On January 22, 2013 in the 113th Congress, Senator Patrick Leahy
reintroduced VAWA as S. 47.139 S. 47 tracked the language of the
previous S. 1925 in almost all key respects,140 including adding
stalking to the list of eligible crimes for U visa eligibility and changing

133. See Serwer, supra note 119 (recognizing that U visas are a tool for law
enforcement officials as well as beneficial for immigrant victims).
134. See VAWA Runs into Stumbling Blocks, CQ ALMANAC (2012), http://library.
cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal12-1531-87297-2553305 (asserting that
the House and Senate could not agree on provisions to expand the law or make it
stricter); see also Samantha Kimmey, Senate Passes VAWA Without Republican Changes,
WOMENS ENEWS (Apr. 25, 2012), http://womensenews.org/story/domestic-violence/
120426/senate-passes-vawa-without-republican-changes#.UxijGv00qCY (noting that the
Senate also rejected three proposed amendments to VAWA).
135. See KANDEL CRS 2012, supra note 28, at 13–14. The Senate-approved version
of S. 1925 included a sunset provision for the increase in the U visa cap. See id. at
n.73 (providing the increase will sunset once the balance is used).
136. See Tom Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes: Should Non-Indians Be
Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority Under VAWA?, J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS,
July 2012, at 40, 40 (“S. 1925 was rejected by the House of Representatives, which
offered its own version of the VAWA re-authorization in H.R. 4970.”); see also VAWA
Runs into Stumbling Blocks, supra note 134 (stating that House Republicans did not
want to conference with the Senate on the Senate bill because it contained a
provision to raise fees for some immigrant visas).
137. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text; see also KANDEL CRS 2012,
supra note 28, at 14–16 (citing, for example, the provision in H.R. 4970 requiring a
higher standard of evidence for VAWA petitions).
138. Laura C. Sayler, Note, Back to Basics: Special Domestic Violence Jurisdiction in the
Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013 and the Expansion of Inherent Tribal
Sovereignty, 2014 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 6 n.22 (2014); see also WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERVICE, R42477, IMMIGRATION PROVISIONS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN ACT (VAWA) 15 (2013) [KANDEL CRS 2013] (declaring that after the passage
of H.R. 4790, a procedural complication arose because the Constitution mandates
that revenue-raising legislation begin in the House and that the S. 1925 provision to
increase fees for certain visas sparked controversy).
139. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong.
(2013). In the House of Representatives, Representative Gwen Moore (D-Wisconsin)
introduced H.R.11, which had similar immigrant-friendly provisions. Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, H.R. 11, 113th Cong. (2013).
140. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
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the age-out procedures to protect children who reach twenty-one
years of age before their VAWA petitions were approved.141 Yet,
importantly, and in a concession to critics’ prior concerns of
purported fiscal waste and extensive fraud, S. 47 did not include the
provision to allow for the increase in the cap on U visas from 10,000
to 15,000.142 This “leaner” S. 47 quickly made it through the Senate
and, after reconciling the controversy concerning the provisions
regarding jurisdiction for criminal prosecutions on tribal lands,143
also passed the House of Representatives.144 Almost two years after
the initial introductions of the proposed reauthorizing legislation,
President Obama signed VAWA 2013 into law in March 2013.145
The trajectory of VAWA since 1994 is illustrative in several key
components. First, the importance of VAWA to victims of domestic
violence cannot be overstated. Since 1994, over $4.7 billion in
federal funds have been used to assist organizations serving victims of
domestic violence across the country through a broad network of
grants and programs.146 Administered by the Office of Violence
Against Women as part of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ),147
VAWA funds and programs have had extraordinarily far-reaching
effects in community efforts to end domestic violence. Moreover,
VAWA has provided key benefits to specialized groups of victims,
including immigrants and other politically and socially marginalized
people, like Native Americans and members of the LGBT
community.148 Indeed, it is this inclusion of benefits for subordinated
141. See KANDEL CRS 2013, supra note 138, at 16 (observing that VAWA coverage
would also be extended to derivative children whose self-petitioning parent died
during the petition process).
142. Id.
143. See Smith, supra note 116 (recognizing the controversy over whether allowing
tribal courts to prosecute non-Native Americans accused of domestic violence
against Native American victims would adequately protect non-Native Americans’
constitutional rights).
144. See S.1925 (112th): Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1925#overview (last visited
Dec. 19, 2014) (noting the bill passed in the House on May 16, 2012).
145. Id.
146. SEGHETTI & BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 4; see also Grant Programs, U.S. DEP’T
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ovw/grant-programs (last visited Dec. 19, 2014)
(asserting that twenty-four grant programs are currently administered by the
Department of Justice’s Office on Violence Against Women).
147. See SEGHETTI & BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 4 (recognizing that the Office on
Violence Against Women was created within the DOJ in 1995 to administer grants
under the VAWA).
148. VAWA incorporated provisions benefiting Native Americans in 1994 when
the federal government implemented a full faith and credit requirement stating that
state and tribes must honor and enforce other jurisdictions’ protection orders as if
the orders were their own. See Melissa L. Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary: Challenges
Facing Tribal Governments in Implementing the Full Faith and Credit Provisions of the
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and marginalized communities that obstructed VAWA’s eventual
passage in 2013. To understand this transition from broadly
supported legislation up to and including the VAWA 2005
reauthorization to the controversy that surrounded VAWA 2013, the
intersections of marginalized identity undergirding the status of
immigrant victims of domestic violence must be addressed and
explored. Part III undertakes the exploration of this intersection,
applying the theory to the VAWA 2013 example.
III. THE IMMIGRANT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIM AT THE CROSSROADS
OF SUBORDINATION: THE INFLUENCE OF IDENTITY POLITICS ON THE
VAWA 2013 LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California) succinctly encapsulated
the crux of the debate surrounding the VAWA 2013 reauthorization:
Let me put this on the table. . . . This bill [S. 1925, introduced in
2012] includes lesbians and gay men.
The bill includes
undocumented immigrants who are victims of domestic abuse.
The bill gives Native American tribes authority to prosecute
crimes. In my view these are improvements. Domestic violence is
domestic violence.149

Feinstein was essentially identifying the source of the conflict that
characterized the VAWA 2013 reauthorization fight: emphasis on the
benefits given to marginalized populations made VAWA problematic
for politically conservative legislators.
Indeed, for the first time in its almost twenty-year history, VAWA
encountered significant opposition in the 2012–2013 reauthorization
process. Despite the history of including immigrant victims of
domestic violence in VAWA since its inception in 1994,150 the
legislative proposals and advocacy efforts aimed at assisting
immigrant domestic violence victims ignited virulent controversy in
VAWA 2013. Though part of the vulnerable population targeted for
benefits under VAWA, in a political environment marked for its anti-

Violence Against Women Acts, 90 KY. L.J. 123, 132 (2002). Although VAWA 1994 (and
subsequent VAWA reauthorizations) highlights violence against women, the
language has always been gender-neutral and not exclusionary (though also not
explicit inclusionary) to same sex victims. See Pamela M. Jablow, Note, Victims of
Abuse and Discrimination: Protecting Battered Homosexuals Under Domestic Violence
Legislation, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1100 (2000).
149. Ted Barrett, Accusations Fly in Senate over Violence Against Women Act, CNN,
www.cnn.com/2012/03/15/politics/senate-vawa-accusations (last updated Mar. 15,
2012, 8:40 PM).
150. Moreover, since VAWA 1994, the law contemplated a measure of protections
for tribal and LGBT victims. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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immigrant focus, the immigrant domestic violence victim is deemed
not as worthy of benefits and for help as are other victims.151
This anti-immigrant animus stems in part from racialized and
gendered attitudes about immigrant communities. Immigrants of
color and immigrant women particularly bear the brunt of the
negative rhetoric surrounding immigration reform. Moreover, as the
literal noncitizen, the immigrant outsider does not benefit from the
positive attribution that derives from being a citizen. As a result, the
inclusion of the immigrant victim of domestic violence in the law’s
reach becomes divisive and affects the law’s passage. Moreover, the
proposed provisions of VAWA 2013 aimed at helping immigrant
victims uniquely—like the proposal to increase the cap on the number
of U visas for immigrant victims of crime152—faced a hard-fought and
ultimately unsuccessful battle.153 As a marginalized, disenfranchised,
and otherwise politically and socially subordinated community,
immigrants face anti-immigrant rhetoric, policies, and politics.154
151. The author has explored the power of the immigrant in swaying legislative
outcomes. See Mariela Olivares, The Impact of Recessionary Politics on Latino-American
and Immigrant Families: SCHIP Success and DREAM Act Failure, 55 HOW. L.J. 359, 385–
86 (2012) [hereinafter Olivares, Recessionary Politics] (comparing the Development,
Relief, and Education for Minors Act (DREAM Act) failure with the State Children
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) success, and noting that the DREAM Act failed
because its purpose was to benefit undocumented immigrants, unlike SCHIP, which
was targeted towards helping uninsured children). By comparison, the immigrant
domestic violence victim is seen as a similarly unworthy beneficiary of legislative
reform in the VAWA context.
152. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. Although VAWA 2013 did not
raise the cap on the number of U visas available to immigrant victims of crime,
Congress loosened certain changes to definitions and eligibility requirements. See
supra note 106 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. The U.S. Senate passed an earlier
version of a VAWA reauthorization bill, which provided for an increase from 10,000
to 15,000 U visas. S. 1925, 112th Cong. § 805(a)(2) (2012). A month later, however,
the House passed its own version without the increase. H.R. 4970, 112th Cong. § 802
(2012). The VAWA 2013 reauthorization ultimately maintained the 10,000 U visa
limit. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(1) (2014) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2) (2012)) (noting
that only 10,000 U-1 visas can be granted each year). Meanwhile, the popularity of
the program has continued to grow and to fall short of need. See Press Release, U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., USCIS Approves
10,000 U Visas for 5th Straight Fiscal Year (Dec. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-approves-10000-u-visas-5th-straight-fiscal-year
(announcing less than three months into fiscal year 2014 that the cap for U visas had
been met for the fifth straight year).
154. One need only spend a brief amount of time perusing popular media sources
to understand the environment surrounding topics of illegal immigration. Racist
and xenophobic vitriol in the guise of nativism or, worse, patriotism is prevalent on
television talk shows and news programs and on the Internet in media sources, blogs,
and the anonymous comment sections commonly placed after such sources. See, e.g.,
Glenn Beck, Transcripts: Arrests of Terror Suspects Reveal Security Concerns, CNN,
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0705/09/gb.01.html (last visited Dec.
19, 2014) (“I’ve got a quick message for illegal aliens if you happen to be watching.
You better start packing your bags. And to the politicians in Washington who are soft
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This Part explores law and policy aimed at helping vulnerable
populations to show how inclusion of the immigrant outsider within
proposed legislation detrimentally affects the legislation’s passage
into law. The discussion considers the tri-faceted subordinated identity
of immigrant victims of domestic violence and comments on how this
identity obstructed the VAWA reauthorization process in 2013.
A. The Immigrant Victim of Domestic Violence Is a Person of Color: Race in
the VAWA 2013 Controversy
The intersection of subordination theory and immigration law is
not a new concept. Scholars have highlighted the obvious racialized
restrictions and focus that immigration law and policy has espoused
since the earliest establishment of congressional plenary power in
immigration law.155 In the seminal case of Chae Chan Ping v. United
States,156 which upheld the plenary power of Congress to create
immigration law, the laws at issue formally restricted the immigration
Implicit in the restrictions was a
of Chinese immigrants.157
preference—indeed, a requirement—that new Americans be white,
although the construction of “whiteness” was not well defined.158
Coupled with the long-standing and enduring requirements in
immigration law that exclude noncitizens who are “public charge[s],”159
have criminal records,160 and have certain mental or physical
on illegal immigration, start packing up your office, because when the terrorists
strike, which they will, and we find out that they’re here illegally from some other
country, we will be telling all of you to get the hell out.”); Glenn Beck, Transcripts:
No Pardon for Border Patrol Agents, CNN, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
0701/12/gb.01.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2014) (“It’s time we wake up in this
country. We are dealing with an illegal alien crime wave, and drug smuggling is
just the beginning.”).
155. See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
1 (10th ed. 2006) (recognizing that Congress limited naturalization to “white
persons” in 1790); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race
Relations: A “Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1115 (1998)
[hereinafter Johnson, Magic Mirror] (asserting that it is not a coincidence that antiimmigrant sentiment has risen in tandem with anti-minority backlash).
156. 130 U.S. 581 (The Chinese Exclusion Case) (1889).
157. Id. at 589, 604–11 (“The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident
of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time
when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it,
cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.”).
158. See id. at 595–97, 606–07 (proposing that Chinese laborers had a “baneful
effect” on California’s material interests); see LÓPEZ, supra note 155, at 27 (noting
passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, creation of the “Asiatic barred zone” in
1917, a Senate bill excluding “all members of the African or black race,” and a quota
system designed to limit immigration to western and northern Europeans (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
159. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2012).
160. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).
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disabilities,161 the race and ethnicity requirements shaped what
American society values in prospective members of its citizenship.162
As a result of the implementation of these U.S. immigration laws,
immigrants of color experience a heightened measure of
subordination and oppression. As Kevin Johnson writes, “[a]t
bottom, U.S. immigration law historically has operated—and
continues to operate—to prevent many poor and working
noncitizens of color from migrating to, and harshly treating those
living in, the United States.”163 Johnson chronicles the racialized
categorization of immigration law, noting the explicit racism of the
Chinese exclusion laws of the 1800s (the earliest days of formalized
federal immigration law),164 which essentially barred the migration of
Chinese people to the United States and punished those who violated
this prohibition.165 The Immigration Act of 1924 created a national
origins quota system that restricted the immigration of people from
any country of only up to two percent annually of the number of
noncitizens of that nationality represented in the 1890 U.S. census.166
The effect of the quota system was to continue the severe restrictions
on Asian immigrants as well as other non-white immigrants,167 to
161. Id. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii).
162. See Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing the grounds
for exclusion of noncitizens under the U.S. immigration laws as “like a magic mirror,
reflecting the fears and concerns of past Congresses”); Johnson, Magic Mirror, supra
note 155, at 1119–20 (stating that even though discrimination on the basis of
alienage status may mask an intent to discriminate against racial minorities, the
political process subjects noncitizens to the will of the majority because the Supreme
Court typically defers to alienage classifications made by Congress, which are
traditionally “immune from legal constraint”). Although immigration law contained
explicit racist exclusions and quotas, the first major wave of elimination of
racialized quotas did not occur until 1965, when Congress enacted the Immigration
and Nationality Act amendments of 1965. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil
Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996) (providing a historical analysis of
the 1965 INA amendments and concluding, based on interviews with politicians
and government officials who worked on the amendments, that Congress intended
that race would not be a factor in immigration law).
163. Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and
Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson, Intersection
of Race and Class].
164. Id. at 15–22; see also GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19–43 (1996) (describing the
federalization of immigration law in the late 1800s as well as state legislative
immigration activities during the same time period with respect to, among other
categories of people, noncitizen criminals and foreign poor and disabled individuals).
165. Johnson, Magic Mirror, supra note 155, at 1120.
166. See id. at 1127–28 (recognizing that Congress passed the quota system after
passing legislation requiring a literacy test that excluded all illiterate aliens over
the age of sixteen).
167. See id. at 1127–30 (noting that southern and western European immigrants
“were racialized as non-white” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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“keep[] America American,”168 to “confine immigration as much as
possible to western and northern European stock”169 and, thus, to
essentially target the rise of immigration from southern and eastern
European countries.
This pervasive preference for white immigrants, who were deemed
to be easily assimilated into the dominant American culture,
continued through the twentieth century.170 Between the 1880s and
the repeal of the national origin quota system in 1965, immigration
law targeted various groups of immigrants of color. During the
Depression, for example, efforts to deport low-wage workers,
primarily Mexican immigrants and people of Mexican descent,
resulted in the forcible deportation of roughly 500,000 people, the
majority of whom were U.S. citizens.171 Beyond immigration to the
United States, immigration law has historically prohibited people of
color from becoming U.S. citizens. Ian Haney López writes about the
prohibition of the acquisition of citizenship by people of color
through both birthright citizenship and naturalization, noting that
birthright citizenship and naturalized citizenship were both
conditioned on race until 1940 and 1952, respectively.172
Although the immigration law restrictions on acquisition of
citizenship and of naturalization ended, and the Immigration Act of
1965 abandoned the explicit prohibitionary quota system against
people of color and the limitations on who can lawfully migrate to
this country,173 the cumulative effect of decades of restrictive
legislating and policymaking is a system in which immigrants of color
receive heightened scrutiny in seeking immigration status and
relief.174 Indeed, as more immigrants of color came to the United
168. A. Warner Parker, The Quota Provisions of the Immigration Act of 1924, 18 AM. J.
INT’L L. 737, 740 (1924).
169. LÓPEZ, supra note 155, at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. See LÓPEZ, supra note 155, at 27 (stating that the restriction on immigration to
the United States on the basis of race lasted from 1880 until 1965); Johnson, Magic
Mirror, supra note 155, at 1129–30 (recognizing that the national origins quota
system was designed to preserve the traditional cultural and sociological balance of
the United States).
171. LÓPEZ, supra note 155, at 27 (citing U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 10 (1980))
(suggesting that the mass deportation was spurned by the economic distress of the
Great Depression).
172. Id. at 28–34.
173. Immigration and National Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also Johnson, Intersection of
Race and Class, supra note 163, at 2–3 (adding that the 1960s civil rights movement
led to the elimination of the quota system in the 1965 INA amendments); Johnson,
Magic Mirror, supra note 155, at 1131 (same).
174. See Johnson, Magic Mirror, supra note 155, at 1133 (recognizing that “similarly
situated persons . . . may face radically different waits for immigration depending on
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States with the relaxation of formalized legal racism,175 anti-immigrant
rhetoric grew louder and took on euphemistic categorizations and
labels aimed at immigrants of color—including the recent example
of “national security.”176 More recently, efforts to target immigrants
of color have come to legislative fruition through federal programs
like Secure Communities,177 which created a mandatory partnership
between local law enforcement and federal immigration
authorities.178
Additionally, states have begun to target these

their country of origin”); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration
Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1839 (2007)
(noting that racial stereotypes heavily influence perceptions about undocumented
immigrants and that the “linkage between perceived alien status and illegal status is
thus cemented in the public mind in racialized terms”); Elizabeth Keyes, Defining
American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101–02
(2013) (examining how the DREAM act is an indication of American’s changing
views on citizenship). As another example, immigration law preferences for
educated immigrants and those who are financially stable are barriers for the
increased immigration of people from the developing world who, overwhelmingly,
are people of color. See generally Johnson, Intersection of Race and Class, supra note 163
(explaining that U.S. immigration laws discriminate directly and indirectly on the
basis of class and race because they discriminate against poor immigrants).
175. The relative percentage of individuals gaining legal permanent resident
status has shifted drastically based on countries of last residence. See Yearbook of
Immigration Statistics:
2012, tbl.2, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2012-legal-permanent-residents
(showing that 56% of LPRs came from European countries during the 1950s but
accounted for just 13% of LPRs from 2000–2009, while, in stark contrast, LPRs
from non-white regions increased substantially over the same period, including
from Latin America and the Caribbean (20.3% to 41%), Asia (5.4% to 33.7%), and
Africa (0.5% to 7.4%)).
176. Assertions seem more legitimate when overtly racist terminology is replaced
with facially neutral language such as “national security,” but this may be little more
than a semantic proxy for racist motivations.
See infra notes 187–90 and
accompanying text (detailing several examples of racism in immigration law and
policy); see also Katarina Ramos, Criminalizing Race in the Name of Secure Communities,
48 CAL. W. L. REV. 317, 341 (2012) (noting that, although Secure Communities is
ostensibly geared towards deporting violent criminals, it actually targets any
undocumented person in its implementation).
177. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-161, tit. II, 121
Stat. 1844, 2050 (appropriating two-hundred million dollars to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance efforts to remove aliens from the United
States after they are deemed deportable for being convicted of a crime or
sentenced to imprisonment).
178. See Secure Communities:
Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited
Dec. 19, 2014) (attempting to resolve “confusion” about the mandatory nature of the
Secure Communities program by clarifying that jurisdictions “cannot opt out” of the
program); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, ICE Unveils Sweeping New Plan to Target Criminal Aliens in
Jails Nationwide (Mar. 28, 2008), available at https://www.ice.gov/news/
releases/0804/080414washington.htm (adding that one of the most important
features of the plan is the distribution of integration technology that will link local
law enforcement agencies to DHS and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
biometric databases).
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communities—as Arizona did in Senate Bill 1070 (S.B. 1070),179
which delegates immigration enforcement powers to local Arizona
police and authorities.180 Under the guise of national security
concerns and “protecting our borders” hype, Secure Communities
and S.B. 1070 have operated to disproportionately target immigrants
of color for arrest, incarceration, and eventual removal from the
country.181 Recognizing that immigrants of color are perpetual law
enforcement targets in the implementation of these laws, scholars
and activists have rallied against the provisions,182 asserting that the
measures unconstitutionally deputize local law enforcement regimes
with federal immigration authority and serve as a proxy for racial
profiling practices.183 Thus, although neither federal nor local laws
179. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). The U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated most of S.B. 1070’s provisions but upheld a provision that established a
local and federal immigration partnership. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492, 2507–10 (2012) (providing that if a state officer makes a lawful arrest, the
officer may contact ICE to verify the arrestee’s immigration status before the
person is released).
180. See generally Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona
Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010) (discussing the central legal issues
raised by S.B. 1070, such as those involving “federalism, criminal law and procedure,
and interaction with existing law”).
181. See Ramos, supra note 176, at 341 (concluding that communities intimidate
residents with the Secure Communities program by placing “people [typically]
unnoticed by ICE [in] removal proceedings,” thereby “creat[ing] an atmosphere of
fear, and . . . a group of even further second-class citizens”); Yolanda Vazquez,
Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the Incorporation of
Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639, 674 (2011)
(surveying recent federal and state measures, including Secure Communities, which
have “expanded and entrenched a ‘criminal alien’ social construct that both legitimizes
and increases the harsh measures against Latinos”); William E. Gibson, Deportation
Program Targets Felons but Nets Those Without Criminal Records, SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 16,
2014), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2014-02-16/news/fl-florida-deportations-sparkpushback-20140213_1_secure-communities-criminal-records-deportations (reporting that
nearly 6,000 people who did not have known criminal records were deported from
Florida over the last five years because of Secure Communities).
182. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona Became
Ground Zero for the Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Latino
Civil Rights in America, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (asserting that S.B. 1070
was the legislature’s attempt to rid the state of people who are or appear to be
Latino); Ramos, supra note 176, at 329 (proffering that the goal of Secure
Communities is to propagate racial bias through a flawed correlation of people of
Mexican descent with undocumented immigrants); Daniel Denvir, The ICE Man:
Obama’s Backdoor Arizona-Style Program, SALON (July 17, 2010, 7:01 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2010/07/16/immigration_safe_communities_obama (pointing
out the contradiction between the Obama Administration’s condemnation of
Arizona’s SB 1070 with its support for the federal Secure Communities program,
which in some cases has had the same effect of racializing and criminalizing
immigrants as did the Arizona bill); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510 (enjoining as
federally preempted all provisions of Arizona Law S.B. 1070 except the provision that
allowed for officers to check the immigration status of arrestees).
183. See, e.g., Ramos, supra note 176, at 318 (asserting that Secure Communities
encourages counties and law enforcement officers to engage in racial profiling).
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explicitly and formally include racially or ethnocentrically prohibitive
provisions, the practical effect of law and policy is to continue to
disparately oppress immigrants of color.
As immigrants of color are subordinated by racial and ethnocentric
policies inherent within the immigration law system and that
permeate broader American societal norms, the policies have a
heightened detrimental effect on immigrant domestic violence
victims of color. In her seminal work concerning the intersection of
marginalizing characteristics that affect women of color who are
victims of domestic violence, Kimberlé Crenshaw notes,
“Intersectional subordination . . . is frequently the consequence of
the imposition of one burden that interacts with preexisting
vulnerabilities
to
create
yet
another
dimension
of
184
disempowerment.”
Thus, the immigrant domestic violence victim
in the United States confronts a host of disempowering burdens that
heighten her marginalizing experience, including a lack of English
proficiency, poverty, and ignorance of the laws and justice system and
of the role of police and law enforcement, as highlighted in Part I.185
Additionally, if she is a person of color or perceived as a person of
color, the immigrant victim of domestic violence also contends with
the oppressive effects of racialized immigration law and policy
regimes. As a result, legislation and policy aimed at benefiting these
immigrants—like the immigration provisions of VAWA 2013—must
battle against these racially motivated systems to ultimately prevail.
Indeed, in his many statements opposing the expansion of
provisions for marginalized communities in VAWA 2013 and
remarking on the 2012 version (S. 1925), Senator Grassley stated that
“[i]f every group is a priority, no group is a priority.”186 Such
commentary, coupled with the misguided belief that immigrantfriendly provisions in VAWA 2013 will perpetuate widespread
immigration fraud and lead to “U.S. citizenship for foreign con artists
and criminals”187 ignores the long and deep history of explicit and
implicit racism in formal and informal immigration law and policy.
To be sure, racist anti-immigrant rhetoric continues to permeate the
political environment in the current era of comprehensive
immigration reform.188 In a March 2013 interview regarding his views
184. Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 1249.
185. See supra Part I (describing the vulnerabilities of battered immigrants).
186. Press Release, Senator Grassley on VAWA, supra note 122.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto, Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric Is Anti-Latino,
THE NATION (Feb. 24, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/166442/
anti-immigrant-rhetoric-anti-latino# (observing that the 2012 Republican primary

OLIVARES.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2/3/2015 8:15 PM

270

[Vol. 64:231

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

on immigration reform measures facing Congress, Representative
Don Young (R-Alaska) referred to migrant farmworkers as
“wetbacks.”189 Representative Steve King (R-Iowa), a vocal opponent
of congressional efforts at comprehensive immigration reform that
includes provisions for regularizing the immigration status of
undocumented immigrants, declared in a July 2013 interview that
“[f]or everyone who’s a valedictorian [in reference to the
beneficiaries of the failed DREAM Act], there’s another 100 out there
who weigh 130 pounds—and they’ve got calves the size of cantaloupes
because they’re hauling 75 pounds of marijuana across the desert.”190
Consequently, it is not a stretch to conclude that racist prejudices
endure in congressional decision making and that such attitudes
inform legislative advocacy, support, and opposition. In VAWA 2013,
by attempting to shut out immigrants from an expanded purview of
benefits, VAWA critics furthered and bolstered racialized regimes
against immigrants of color.
B. The Immigrant Domestic Violence Victim Is a Woman: How Gender
Animus Influenced VAWA 2013
Compounded with her identity as an immigrant of color, the
immigrant domestic violence victim also must contend with gender
animus. Although domestic violence affects both men and women,
the societal image of the domestic violence victim matches the
became a contest of who had the biggest “anti-immigrant badge” with “top . . .
honor[s]” going to Herman Cain); Eyder Peralta, University of Texas Students Cancel
‘Catch an Illegal Immigrant Game’, NPR (Nov. 19, 2013, 9:46 AM), http://www.npr.
org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/11/19/246122143/university-of-texas-slams-catch-an-illegalimmigrant-game (reporting the cancellation of a game titled “catch an illegal
immigrant” hosted by the Young Conservatives of Texas at the University of Texas
designed purportedly to “spark a campus-wide discussion about the issue of illegal
immigration” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dan Roberts, Immigration Reform
Debate Marred by Angry Clashes in US Senate, THE GUARDIAN (May 9, 2013, 6:05 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/09/immigration-debate-clashes-senate/
print (reporting anti-immigrant language used by U.S. senators in a debate over
comprehensive immigration reform, including comments by Senator John Cornyn,
who spoke about immigrants crossing the Mexican border “wearing turbans,” and
Senator Lindsey Graham, who suggested that individuals cross into the U.S. from
Mexico because they come from “hell hole[s]” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. Rep. Young Apologizes for Using Term ‘Wetbacks’ in Interview, FOX NEWS (Mar.
29, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/29/rep-young-says-meant-nodisrespect-by-using-term-wetbacks (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Todd Beamon & John Bachman, Rep. Steve King Slams Norquist over Attacks
on Immigration, NEWSMAX (July 18, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/
Newsfront/king-norquist-attacks-immigration/2013/07/18/id/515882 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see infra notes 234–35 and accompanying text (discussing the young
people who were intended beneficiaries of the failed Development, Relief, and Education
for Minors (“DREAM”) Act legislation as the best and brightest of the immigrant
community, including high-achieving students and engaged community members).
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historical statistics proving that women are far more often the
victims of violence than are men.191 As such, the immigrant woman
domestic violence victim suffers the effects of gender bias that
pervade immigration law and policy, specifically, and societal
expectations, generally.
First, as a woman in 2014, the immigrant victim of domestic
violence confronts an anti-woman political rhetoric. For example,
states across the United States have passed a spectrum of legislation
restricting women’s access to abortion and reproductive health
services192—laws that affect women uniquely. Under the banner of a
pro-life agenda, proponents of such measures have fought against
making abortion available only in the case of rape or severe health
risks to the mother,193 arguing, for example, that a rape exception is
not needed because a woman cannot biologically get pregnant after

191. See Domestic Violence Facts, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (July
2007), http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf (reporting
that eighty-five percent of domestic violence victims in the United States are women).
192. E.g., H.B. 2, 83rd Leg., 2d Sess. §§ 2–3 (Tex. 2013) (banning abortions after
twenty weeks, requiring doctors performing an abortion to have admitting privileges
at a nearby hospital, and requiring that all abortions be performed in surgical
centers); H.B. 2780, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. § 2 (Okla. 2010) (requiring a woman to
undergo an ultrasound during which the performing doctor is required to
“[p]rovide a simultaneous explanation of what the ultrasound is depicting”),
invalidated by Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013); see also State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 4, 2014), available at https://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf (reporting that, as of November 1, 2014, 26 states
require women seeking an abortion to wait a specified period of time before undergoing
the procedure; 42 states prohibit abortions after a certain point in pregnancy, with
limited exceptions where an abortion is necessary for the mother’s life and health; and
38 states require parental involvement in a minor’s decision to have an abortion).
193. E.g., H.B. 819, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4(c) (Miss. 2013) (justifying a 2013
Mississippi abortion ban lacking a rape exception by proclaiming that the State of
Mississippi would not punish “persons conceived through a sexual assault . . . with
the loss of his or her life”); see also SHARON LEVIN ET AL., NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR.,
“SHUT THAT WHOLE THING DOWN:” A SURVEY OF ABORTION RESTRICTIONS EVEN IN
CASES OF RAPE 4 (2013), available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/
pdfs/shutthatwholethingdown_report_final.pdf (providing examples of states, such
as the State of Mississippi, that have attempted to prohibit rape victims from
obtaining abortions); Susan Donaldson James, Oklahoma Abortion Law: No Exceptions,
Even Rape, ABC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/oklaabortion-law-exceptions-rape/story?id=10507849 (reporting that a new State of
Oklahoma abortion law did not include exceptions for victims of rape and incest).
But see Laura Bassett, Rape, Incest Exceptions Quietly Added to Trent Franks’ Abortion Bill,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/14/rape-exceptionabortion-trent-franks_n_3443916.html (last updated June 14, 2013, 5:48 PM)
(reporting backlash over U.S. Representative Trent Franks’ comment that “the
incidence of rape resulting in pregnancy are very low” and Franks’ subsequent
inclusion of an exception for rape and incest in his proposed federal anti-abortion
bill (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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being raped.194 Similarly, in 2012, the Oversight and Government
Reform Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives held a
hearing on the federal government’s decision not to exempt
religiously affiliated employers from having to offer health insurance
that covers contraception to their employees.195 The hearing
included a panel comprised exclusively of ten men from politically
conservative religious organizations.196 That access to birth control
and pregnancy affects women directly, with women bearing the
overwhelming effect of such contraceptive decisions, was of little
consequence to many legislators.
Alarming in their ignorance, these ideas are fueled by centuries of
ideology and practice—both cultural and formalistic—which hold
women inferior to men. As Lawrence Sager surmises in discussing the
importance of passing VAWA as a remedy for gender discrimination:
For much of our history, women have been disabled by the laws of
every state and the national government. Women were excluded
from the franchise, from many political offices, from occupations
spanning the professional Bar to the tending of bars, and from
many elite academic institutions. Women were hobbled in their
ability to engage in commercial transactions and, upon marriage,
saw their property rights attributed to their husbands. Most
importantly for our purposes here, perhaps, women were made
explicitly and legally vulnerable to the physical predations of
their husbands.197

Gender animus is heightened for the victim of domestic violence,
who faces these perceptions while also navigating a broader
discriminatory societal system.
As Sally Goldfarb notes, this
intersection between the gender (women) status of domestic violence
194. See John Eligon & Michael Schwirtz, Senate Candidate Provokes Ire with
‘Legitimate Rape’ Comment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/08/20/us/politics/todd-akin-provokes-ire-with-legitimate-rape-comment.html?_r=0
(reporting Representative Todd Akin’s assertion that “[i]f it’s a legitimate rape,
the female body has ways to try to shut that whole thing down” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
195. Laura Bassett & Amanda Terkel, House Democrats Walk Out of One-Sided
Hearing on Contraception, Calling It an ‘Autocratic Regime’, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/16/contraception-hearing-house-democratswalk-out_n_1281730.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2012, 2:00 PM). In the summer of
2014, the U.S. Supreme Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. held that a federal
regulatory mandate requiring corporations to provide their employees with health
insurance coverage for contraceptive methods that the companies’ owners sincerely
believe facilitate abortions substantially burdened the free exercise of religion. 134
S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
196. Bassett & Terkel, supra note 195.
197. Lawrence G. Sager, Congress’s Authority to Enact the Violence Against Women Act:
One More Pass at the Missing Argument, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 629, 631–32 (2012)
(footnotes omitted).
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victims is compounded by the gender discrimination women face,
generally and specifically, as a result of their identity as domestic
violence victims.198 Indeed, VAWA was explicitly promoted in part on
the premise that domestic violence affected women more critically
because of pervasive societal gender discrimination. Goldfarb, for
example, expertly summarizes how members of Congress lobbied for
VAWA 1994 by touting how violence against women amounted to
gender inequality, resulting in higher rates of female poverty and
homelessness while also restricting women’s agency.199 That VAWA at
its inception contemplated gender discrimination underscores the
importance that identity as a woman plays for the victim of violence.
Similarly, immigration law and policy has historically embraced a
gender divide, positioning women at a disadvantage in procuring and
retaining immigration benefits. Much like the formalized racist
provisions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries discussed
above,200 early immigration law and policy also contained explicitly
sexist discriminatory provisions. With its origins in the legal doctrine
of coverture in which women were essentially considered property of
their husbands and were unable to act independently in the eyes of
the law,201 early immigration law contained provisions that formally
discriminated against women, including both foreign nationals
looking to immigrate and U.S. citizen women.202 Until the provisions
198. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against
Women: Some Reflections on Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 251,
251–52 (2003) (arguing that domestic violence “occurs on a continuum” with other
types of discrimination, including workplace inequality and deprivation of
reproductive rights).
199. Id. at 255–57. Professor Goldfarb further notes that, to successfully argue
that Congress had power to implement VAWA under the Commerce Clause, Congress
had to prove that “violence undermines women’s ability to function as economic
actors and exacerbates their economic inferiority to, and dependency on, men.” Id.
200. See supra notes 155–70 and accompanying text (discussing early U.S. laws
explicitly restricting immigration based on race).
201. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 (clarifying that under the law
of coverture, the woman, a “feme-covert,” was incorporated or consolidated into the
legal entity of her husband during their marriage); see also Janet M. Calvo, SpouseBased Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593, 596 (1991)
(explaining that under the law of coverture, married women could not, among other
things, make contracts, independently sue or be sued, or make a will); Marisa
Cianciarulo, U.S. Immigration Law: Where Antiquated Views on Gender and Sexual
Orientation Go to Die, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1897, 1897–99 (2009) (describing the history
of gender inequality in U.S. immigration law).
202. See Calvo, supra note 201, at 600–01 (discussing how the law of coverture was
incorporated into early immigration laws to give a husband dominance and control
over his alien or immigrant wife and explaining that a noncitizen woman seeking
lawful status encountered restrictions rooted in the popular belief that wives were
subservient to their husbands); Cianciarulo, supra note 201, at 1898 (explaining that
gender inequality in U.S. immigration has taken many forms, from “blatant
discrimination . . . [to] facially neutral laws . . . [with] a disparate impact based on sex”).
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of VAWA 1994 allowing for a self-petitioning process for certain
battered immigrants,203 foreign national women were beholden to
their husbands’ actions in allowing for their immigration to the
United States.204 Moreover, only those foreign national women who
themselves could be citizens—i.e., only white women—could
naturalize through their U.S. citizen husbands.205 Similarly, U.S.
citizen women were at one time stripped of their citizenship if they
married foreign nationals ineligible for citizenship.206 As Ian Haney
López observes, this law (partially repealed in 1922) had a distinctly
oppressive effect on U.S. citizen white women who wished to marry
foreign nationals of color who were themselves forbidden entry into
the ranks of U.S. citizenship.207
Although VAWA and its provisions for immigrants heralded an
appreciation for the plight of women208 and the explicitly sexist
discriminatory provisions of immigration law have been repealed,209
immigration law and policy continues to disproportionately
disadvantage women. As discussed above, the 1986 Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments, which purported to address a
proliferation of sham marriages for immigration benefits,210
disproportionally affected and targeted women who were dependent

203. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; see also supra note 56 and
accompanying text (noting that even in VAWA, the domestic violence victim still
must be married to the abuser to qualify for relief).
204. See LÓPEZ, supra note 155, at 33 (citing Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10
Stat. 1604) (explaining that under an 1855 Act of Congress, “a foreign woman
automatically acquired citizenship upon marriage to a U.S. citizen, or upon the
naturalization of her alien husband”).
205. Id.
206. See id. at 34 (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228)
(providing that American women who married foreigners were required to take their
husband’s nationality).
207. Id. (citing Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022) (explaining
that although Congress repealed the 1922 law, women who married non-white
foreigners were still stripped of their citizenship until 1931); see also Kelly v. Owen, 74
U.S. 496, 498 (1868) (explaining that under the 1855 Act only “free white women”
could gain citizenship by marrying U.S. citizens); Cianciarulo, supra note 201, at 1898
(listing the 1855 Act as one example of gender inequality that women have faced
under U.S. immigration law); Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Restrictions on Naturalization:
The Recurring Intersection of Race and Gender in Immigration and Citizenship Law, 11
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 142, 161 (1996) (arguing that these race-based laws penalized
women for marrying non-white citizens).
208. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text (describing how VAWA created
a self-petition process for battered immigrant women); see also Cianciarulo, supra
note 201, at 1898 (noting the various ways in which immigration law has moved
towards but not completely achieved gender equality).
209. See LÓPEZ, supra note 155, at 34 (indicating that prior to the repeals,
“marriage to a non-White alien by an American woman was akin to treason against
this country”).
210. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
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on their citizen or LPR husbands for immigration benefits.211
Similarly, the amnesty program of the 1986 IRCA disproportionally
advantaged men,212 who were more often employed in the
agricultural industries that were targeted for benefits in IRCA
amnesty. Undocumented women, on the other hand, were more
often employed in domestic industries (when they could work outside
of the home) and thus could rarely qualify for IRCA amnesty under
the eligibility provisions.213
In more recent congressional and public debates over proposed
comprehensive immigration reform legislation, advocates for women
immigrants have voiced concern over proposals that would give
disproportionate advantages to immigrant men over women,
including proposals that allocate more visas for highly-skilled
immigrants in the science, technology, engineering, and math
fields.214 Because these coveted visas target immigrants with high
levels of education, they favor men, who regularly achieve higher
levels of education than women in many countries around the
world.215 The principal beneficiaries of these visas (again, mostly
men) can petition for their spouses as derivative beneficiary visa

211. See, e.g., Calvo, supra note 201, at 607 (suggesting that the IMFA gave the citizen
or LPR husband even greater “power” over his spouse’s immigration status);
Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 1247 (concluding that under these circumstances, noncitizen
victims of domestic violence were more likely to remain married to their abusers).
212. See Margot Mendelson, The Legal Production of Identities: A Narrative Analysis of
Conversations with Battered Undocumented Women, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 138, 205
(2004) (noting the gender disparity in the immigrants who were granted amnesty
under IRCA and describing the large wave of family members and significant others
who came to the United States seeking family reunification after IRCA granted
amnesty to 2.7 million immigrants).
213. See Mendelson, supra note 212, at 205–06 (arguing that specific IRCA
provisions offering legalization to agricultural workers benefited male immigrants
because agricultural workers are primarily male, noting that IRCA did not include a
similar provision for women who work in homes, and suggesting that on the whole,
IRCA granted more amnesty to men); Laura E. Enriquez, Gendered Laws: VAWA,
IRCA and the Future of Immigration Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 7, 2013, 3:56 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-e-enriquez/domestic-violence-immigration_b_
2793828.html? (arguing that IRCA’s provisions requiring proof of work status
disadvantaged undocumented women who do not often have bills or accounts in
their name and who tend to work in private homes that do not want to confirm
their employment).
214. See Ruth Tam, Can Women Give Immigration Reform the Boost It Needs?, WASH.
POST (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/
2013/11/20/can-women-give-immigration-reform-the-boost-it-needs (observing that the
so-called “gang of eight” tasked with drafting comprehensive immigration reform in
the U.S. Congress in 2013 was comprised of all men (internal quotation marks omitted)).
215. Id.; see also Cianciarulo, supra note 201, at 1905–06 (noting the ways that
immigration law continues to disfavor and oppress women, such as in the U and T
visa implementation and the process for refugee status determination).
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holders.216 Yet, current regulations prohibit many of these derivative
visa holders from lawfully working,217 thereby keeping these spouses
(again, mostly women) financially dependent on their husbands.
Political conservatives opposing the VAWA 2013 reauthorization
continued to bolster formalized gender oppression by challenging
what had for decades been largely noncontroversial legislation. As
noted, by 2013, debates had erupted over various legislative programs
targeting the rights of women. Acknowledging this anti-woman
environment, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California) placed the
VAWA 2012–2013 partisanship within this broader context, noting,
“This is part of a larger effort, candidly, to cut back on rights and
services to women. . . . We’ve seen it go from discussions on Roe v.
Wade, to partial birth abortion, to contraception, to preventive
services for women. This seems to be one more thing.”218 Though
heralding themselves as pro-women, especially in light of Republican
losses among women voting constituencies in the most recent
elections,219 the votes against VAWA 2013 reauthorization aligned
more closely with anti-woman critics, who ascribe to viewpoints that
VAWA is grounded in feminist-created stereotypes, such as that “men
are naturally batterers and women are naturally victims.”220
Thus, even in 2014 (but buoyed by centuries of historical practice),
the immigrant domestic violence victim in the United States
confronts her status as woman in social, political, and legislative
discriminatory systems. As a woman and a woman of color, she is at a
critical intersection of subordinated identity, facing disempowering
burdens that heighten her marginalizing experience. VAWA 2013,
focused on benefiting this population, suffered the political effects of
this oppression.

216. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F), (H) (2012); see 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)–(g) (2014)
(allowing certain principal visa holders to petition for their derivatives).
217. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(15)(i), (h)(9)(iv) (prohibiting H and F visa
holders’ spouses and minor children from working in the United States).
218. Jonathan Weisman, Women Figure Anew in Senate’s Latest Battle, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/us/politics/violence-againstwomen-act-divides-senate.html? (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. See id. (discussing efforts among Republicans to gain electoral support from
women and, in particular, the political difficulties with women voters that accompany
opposing VAWA reauthorization).
220. Phyllis Schlafly, Day of Reckoning for Violence Against Women Act, TOWNHALL
(Feb. 7, 2012), http://townhall.com/columnists/phyllisschlafly/2012/02/07/day_
of_reckoning_for_violence_against_women_act/page/full.
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C. The Immigrant Domestic Violence Victim Is Not a Citizen: How Citizen
Outsider Identity Influenced the VAWA 2013 Debate
Correspondingly, American citizenship-centric laws and societal
structure work to create another system of oppression against
immigrant victims of domestic violence. Much like the racial and
ethnic discriminatory practices that have prevented immigrants of
color from achieving access to and propriety in mainstream American
society,221 the broader constructs of citizenship as the winner among
members of the polity mean that the immigrant—the literal
noncitizen—is the perpetual loser. Thus, her status as a citizen
outsider serves as yet another facet of her subordinated identity, with
concomitant results in the VAWA 2013 political process.
To understand the ways that citizenship enjoys superior cultural,
social and political status as compared to non-citizenship, one must
consider a preliminary basic question: what does “citizenship” even
mean?
Scholars have confronted this question, defining and
exploring the contours of the concept of citizenship, and have come
out with many themes and frameworks from which to understand its
complexities.222 From a rights and privileges framework, citizenship
confers especially important rights—a literal place in the societal
polity—to those afforded its breadth.223 Here, citizenship entails that
those within its membership will benefit from certain formalized
rights and privileges.224
Others have defined the concept of
citizenship as evoking a measure of civic or political engagement.225
Indeed, this “engaged citizen” framework has been a topic of
scholarship, public discussion, and debate through the Development,
Relief, and Education for Minors (“DREAM”) Act legislative journey
and ultimate failure226 and President Obama’s 2012 conferment of

221. See supra Part III.A (discussing historical immigration law with racial and
ethnic requirements that prevented immigrants of color from gaining citizenship).
222. E.g., Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
447, 452, 455 (2000) (noting the various mechanisms analysts have proposed to
distinguish between diverse understandings of citizenship and arguing that
“citizenship can fairly be said to exceed the bounds of the nation to some degree,
though the process of denationalization has occurred more extensively and
meaningfully in some domains than in others”).
223. See id. at 464–65 (explaining how political theorists Judith Shklar and Rogers
Smith have both stated that “citizenship refers to an individual’s ‘standing’ in society”
and have remarked on how the law structures the contours of that standing).
224. Id. at 465.
225. See id. at 470 (explaining that political theorists commonly use the term
“citizenship” to “denote[] active engagement in the life of the political community”).
226. See Mariela Olivares, Renewing the Dream: DREAM Act Redux and Immigration
Reform, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 79, 82–83 (2013) [hereinafter Olivares, DREAM Act
Redux] (describing parallels between immigrants targeted by the DREAM Act and the
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temporary relief from deportation through the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.227 In those examples, immigrant
advocates have characterized potential DREAM Act (“DREAMers”)
and DACA beneficiaries as citizens in a civic and/or politically
engaged sense228 because many of them risked being removed from
the country for speaking out in favor of the legislative proposals.229
Third, as a legal construct, citizenship status is especially powerful.
In this formulation, a nation-state’s geographic and political
borders determine the confines of citizenship of its members.230
Placing the rights and privileges afforded to citizens within the
responsibilities of the nation makes sense: although the construction
may have some complexities, national citizenship is a well-established
concept globally.231
In contrast to a grounding of citizenship within borders, other
scholars have considered citizenship as evoking a personal,
employment-based visa system and factors that determine each group’s desirability as
prospective U.S. citizens).
227. President Barack Obama, Remarks on Immigration Reform and an Exchange
with Reporters (June 15, 2012) (announcing that DHS is allowing young immigrants
“who do not present a risk to national security or public safety . . . to request
temporary relief from deportation proceedings and apply for work authorization”);
see also Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., John Mortion, Dir., U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter DHS Memorandum, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercisingprosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (setting forth
criteria for prosecutorial discretion relating to undocumented young people).
228. See Tara Bahrampour, Students Disclose Illegal Status as Part of Push for
Immigration Law Reform, WASH. POST (July 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/20/AR2010072006121.html (describing undocumented
students’ arrest in Washington, D.C. for protesting in support of the DREAM Act);
DREAM Act Rally in North Carolina Leads to Arrests, FOX NEWS LATINO (Sept. 7, 2011),
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2011/09/07/immigration-rally-leads-toarrests-at-cpcc (discussing a DREAM Act protest in which police arrested over a
dozen people).
229. See Kate Linthicum, L.A. Drops Charges Against Westwood Protesters Who Supported
DREAM Act, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/04/
local/la-me-protesters-20110304 (discussing the Los Angeles city government’s
decision not to prosecute undocumented students arrested in May 2010 for
protesting in support of the DREAM Act); Julia Preston, Illegal Immigrant Students
Protest at McCain Office, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
05/18/us/18dream.html (describing how undocumented students—three of whom
were arrested—staged a sit-in at Senator John McCain’s Tucson office asking for
DREAM Act support).
230. See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 222, at 456 (asserting that the locus of citizenship
status is the nation-state and the bond of allegiance that citizenship represents relates
to the national political community).
231. See, e.g., id. at 456–63 (stating that citizenship is almost always conferred by
the nation-state and that nation-state citizenship is recognized internationally and
suggesting that the rise of dual and multiple citizenship status in the European
Union, for example, would be an exception to the typical practice).
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psychological identity, or as Linda Bosniak summarizes, “people’s
collective experience of themselves.”232 Once again, the experience of
DREAMers and DACA beneficiaries provides an apt example of this
conception of citizenship. Often hailed as the embodiment of the
American dream,233 they are the young people who have been in the
United States since an early age but remain in undocumented
immigration status.234 Their ties to the psychological and cultural
aspects of American citizenship inform their self-perception as
being American even though they remain outside of any formal
legal structure.235
Although the conceptual frameworks by which to understand
citizenship and its contours may differ in application or analysis, what
they have in common is a recognition that in a hierarchal
construction of rights and privileges, the status of “citizen” affords
broader protections than that of alien, immigrant, or noncitizen. As
Bosniak notes in discussing the “citizenship as status” framework but
which could apply generally to noncitizens: aliens are “outsiders to
citizenship” because “they reside in the host country only at the
country’s discretion; there are often restrictions imposed on their
travel; they are denied the right to participate politically . . . and they
are often precluded from naturalizing.
Furthermore, they
symbolically remain outsiders to membership in the polity.”236
Moreover, in the United States, the conferment of this
“membership in the polity” is at the discretion of Congress, which
creates and drafts the laws defining the membership guidelines.
232. Id. at 479.
233. See Olivares, DREAM Act Redux, supra note 226, at 80–82 (describing the
young people who would have benefited from the passage of the DREAM Act but whose
promising futures were dampened by Congress’s failure to pass the DREAM Act).
234. See Keyes, supra note 174, at 103 (discussing how the DREAM Act attempts to
“create[] a path to citizenship for [individuals] who came to the United States before
the age of sixteen, who are still below the age of thirty-five, who have resided in the
United States for at least five years, who completed high school [or an equivalent],
and who . . . possess ‘good moral character’”).
235. See id. at 116 (stating that these young people—dubbed the “DREAMers”—
echo old definitions of the American dream, such as opportunity and contribution,
in their ideas of what being an American citizen entails); see also Ayelet Shachar,
Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110,
115–18 (2011) (positing that people who are most rooted in American society
deserve formalized citizenship pursuant to her concept of “jus nexi” citizenship).
236. Bosniak, supra note 222, at 451 n.10, 461–62, 489–90 (arguing that, no matter
what framework one uses, the concept of citizenship is always one of paramount
importance that performs an enormous legitimizing function and that the word
“citizenship” “communicates the highest political value”); see also Ediberto Román,
The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 557, 567–68 (2006) (articulating that
while the grant of citizenship is significant because it guarantees certain
constitutional rights, its real importance lies in its identification of the individual as
“an equal member of the political community”).
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Through the complex network of laws, regulations, and policies
delineating the rules and procedures affording U.S. citizenship for
immigrants seeking to naturalize, Congress creates the steps and
gates along the way. It is only through the congressional process that
an immigrant can achieve citizenship status through naturalization.237
Whichever conception of citizenship is utilized, the power of
citizen status affects legislative processes and outcomes, as evidenced
by the VAWA 2013 debates. As inclusion in the citizen club confers
certain rights and benefits, exclusion from its network results in
hostility238 and a suppression of benefits through the legislative
process.239 Thus, while the immigrant domestic violence victim—a
woman of color and a noncitizen—experiences the personalized
subordinating experience of her intersected identities, the systemic
marginalization of these identities affects the larger political process.
Indeed, VAWA immigrant beneficiaries fall outside of the societal
and political preference for specialized treatment of U.S. citizens.
But VAWA is not limited to undocumented immigrants: many VAWA
self-petitioners maintain lawful immigration status.240 Thus, the
citizen/noncitizen dichotomy in affording rights to the former and
restricting the rights and benefits of the latter is not necessarily a
debate concerning illegal immigration or the purported scourge of
“illegal aliens” on the United States. The vitriol and nativism
surrounding the illegal immigration debate, however, permeated into
the discussions about VAWA provisions.
For example, lawful
immigrants who would be well on the road toward naturalization (but
for the abuse of their LPR or U.S. citizen petitioning spouse) are still
deemed outside of the polity and thus unworthy of the benefits of
citizenship. The power of the immigrant outsider is especially
237. See, e.g., Marouf, supra note 14, at 135 (“The categories of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’
immigrant are . . . fluid because Congress . . . constantly changes the criteria for
determining when permanent residents should lose their status.”); see also DHS
Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 227 (explaining that
beneficiaries under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program are not
afforded a path to U.S. citizenship).
238. See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 222, at 503 (opining that those who do not enjoy
the citizenship of “one of the world’s most privileged nations” tend to view those
privileged nations “as deeply exclusionary and self-aggrandizing and sometimes
violent institutions”).
239. See Olivares, Recessionary Politics, supra note 151, at 383–88 (comparing the
successful passage of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program with the failure
of the DREAM Act and highlighting that congressional passage of “pure”
immigration law legislative proposals has been decidedly harder because of how the
measure is lobbied and packaged); see also Keyes, supra note 174, at 126 (noting that
proponents of the DREAM Act attempted to provide “a different lens,” that of citizen
through identity, through which to view these youth).
240. See supra Part II.B.1 (outlining the effects of VAWA on immigrant women).
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relevant here because the VAWA self-petition eligibility guidelines
restrict benefits to those immigrants with familial connections to a
U.S. citizen or LPR who would have served as the petitioner in a
family-based petition for LPR status.241 The history of this selfpetitioning process contemplates, then, that this particular category
of immigrant victim of domestic violence was worthy of VAWA relief
only because of this perceived entitlement to the family-based
petition process.
Yet in the 2013 VAWA reauthorization debate, the focus was not on
the well-established history of the immigration provisions in VAWA.
Instead, the rhetoric of VAWA opponents focused on the unproven
assertions that VAWA benefits (including the U visa) were regularly
and frequently misused to commit immigration fraud, or as Senator
Grassley noted, “manipulated as a pathway to U.S. citizenship for
foreign con artists and criminals.”242
These anti-immigrant politics have a history of legislative
obstruction, as Kevin Johnson explored in 1995 concerning
Proposition 187, the proposed California law that would have
stripped undocumented immigrants of access to the few public
benefits they were able to access, including public education.243
Johnson’s admonitions about the state of anti-immigrant proposals in
1995 call to mind the earliest days of formalized immigration law and
policy244 and ring resoundingly true today:
As some of the more draconian immigration laws exemplify,
immigrants historically have been unpopular in the political
process.
This is even more true today for undocumented
immigrants. The unpopularity of immigrants predictably waxes
during times of relative economic uncertainty and hardship. . . .
When immigrants directly cost taxpayers money through
provision of benefits or incarceration (as compared to less clear

241. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that the self-petition
process was only available to women married to or divorced from either a U.S.
citizen or an LPR).
242. Press Release, Senator Grassley on VAWA, supra note 122.
243. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration, supra note 58, at 1515, 1540; see also
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205, 230 (1982) (invalidating a Texas statute that
withheld public funding for educating children who had not been legally admitted to
the United States, thereby upholding the right to primary public education for all
children). See generally Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and
the Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L.
REV. 1757, 1769–84 (2009) (discussing a wave of state-enacted post-secondary
residency requirements).
244. See supra notes 155–62 and accompanying text (discussing harsh provisions in
immigration law regarding entry into the U.S. and deportation).
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costs, such as job displacement), public antipathy for them grows
and they are easy targets.245

More recently, the failure of the DREAM Act to pass Congress proved
that even the narrative of innocent children could not overcome the
political scapegoat that is the undocumented immigrant.246
Similarly, in the VAWA 2013 reauthorization debates, attention was
drawn away from the decades of success in helping victims of
domestic violence and focused instead on the inclusion of the “alien”
outsider—and other marginalized people—within the purview of
proposed expanded VAWA benefits.247 Indeed, in the end and to
secure VAWA’s passage, proponents of the bill had to eliminate the
key provision increasing the 10,000 cap on U visas.248 Although
VAWA 2013 contains important immigrant-friendly provisions,249 the
vociferousness of the debate surrounding the inclusion and
expansion of immigrant provisions aptly illustrates the continuing,
ironic power of the politically and socially marginalized and
disenfranchised immigrant outsider to sway legislation.
CONCLUSION
The long history of formal and informal law and policy, which
explicitly and implicitly works to further subordinate marginalized
communities teaches that, though immigrants in the United States
may have recently achieved more widespread acceptance and
support, identity politics continue to serve as an oppressive force in
the drafting and passing of legislation. From the struggle of
undocumented children seeking access to public education in Plyler
v. Doe,250 to the vitriol surrounding the “illegal alien epidemic” in
California Proposition 187 and Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act rhetoric,251 to the recent efforts to
245. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration, supra note 58, at 1541.
246. See Olivares, Recessionary Politics, supra note 151, at 384–85 (recounting how
the narrative of the future of America’s children used by proponents of the DREAM
Act could not overcome the stigma of the “illegal alien”).
247. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text (highlighting the controversy
surrounding the inclusion of marginalized groups, such as immigrants, Native
Americans, and members of the LGBT community, in the debates).
248. S. 47, 113th Cong. § 805 (2013).
249. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits provided
to key groups, including immigrants, by VAWA 2013).
250. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Plyler upholding the right for undocumented immigrant children
to attend public school).
251. See supra notes 62–65, 243–44 and accompanying text (discussing Proposition
187, the proposed California law that would have denied undocumented immigrants
access to public education, and PRWORA, which prohibited most immigrants from
receiving many types of federally-funded benefits).
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pass the DREAM Act,252 the lesson is that the intersectionality of
subordinated identities yields impressive clout in influencing
legislative progress. In this sense, the reauthorization battle of VAWA
2013 was no different.
What marks the VAWA 2013 political struggle as unique, however,
is the previous noncontroversial nature of the Act, including the
immigration provisions, which have been part of VAWA since its
genesis.
But as this Article has shown, even the most
noncontroversial legislation struggles against the powerful
intersection of identity, which characterizes the immigrant victim of
domestic violence in an oppressive political environment. The
immigrant domestic violence victim faces tri-layered prejudice in her
daily struggles because she is a person of color, a woman, and a
noncitizen. This prejudice also permeates the legislative process.
As an example of legislation—even one aimed at the most
vulnerable among us—VAWA 2013 provides a unique window into
how immigrant outsider identity works against otherwise
uncontroversial legislation.
In the current calls for immigration reform, much political and
public attention has been given to the need for bipartisan movement
and cooperation. Advocates for immigrant domestic violence victims,
buoyed by the eventual success of VAWA 2013, are working to include
provisions that were not passed in VAWA 2013—including the
increased annual cap on U visas253—into the final immigration
reform law. As the debates in Congress and in the broader social and
political communities continue on the plight of immigrants in our
country and the role that immigrants play in our society, the
influence of oppressed identity remains present and powerful.

252. See supra notes 226–35 and accompanying text (highlighting the struggles
experienced by proponents of the DREAM Act to get it passed).
253. See H.R. 15, 113th Cong. § 3406 (2013) (increasing the annual cap on U visas
from 10,000 to 18,000); see also The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and
Immigration Modernization Act (H.R. 15) and Immigrant Survivors of Violence, IMMIGRANT
JUST. (Nov. 2013), http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/
Final%20updated%20HR%2015%20one-pager%2011%2018.pdf (advocating support of
provisions to expand the annual U visa cap from 10,000 to 18,000).

